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Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation studies teacher hiring practices, an avenue to potentially raise teacher 
quality which has not been studied extensively. I analyze three aspects of the teacher hiring 
process, which, if improved, could promote education quality: the principal hiring decision, the 
teacher application decision, and the effects of information on teacher behavior and market 
outcomes in the teacher labor market. The first two are empirical studies utilizing administrative 
data from an urban school district, and the last is a laboratory experiment. 
Education is a labor focused enterprise where outcomes are largely determined by teacher 
quality, so hiring the most productive teachers is paramount. Hiring is even more important 
given that teaching is a high-turnover profession, thus hiring occurs frequently. I first compare 
the elements of a teacher’s application that predict principal hiring decisions to those predicting 
teacher performance and retention outcomes. Similar to other recent work, I find disparities 
between the two sets of predictors. I utilize additional methods to study the relation of the size 
and quality of the applicant pool, as well as how those factors relate to the quality of the selected 
candidate. The results indicate that the applicant pools do not systematically vary by school 
characteristics in an obvious manner. Also, while the quality of the candidate pool may influence 
principal hiring decisions, it is not the dominate factor. 
       
 
 
Given that teaching sorting across schools occurs in the new-teacher labor market (Sass, 
et al. 2012) and in post-hire differential patterns of teacher mobility,1 which in turn create 
disparities in access to effective teachers, it is important to understand the mechanisms that lead 
to teacher sorting across schools. In chapter 2, I study how teacher application behavior reveals 
teacher preferences over schools. The preferences can lead to differences in application pools, 
thereby affecting principals’ ability to hire quality candidates. I find that the application 
decisions of new-to-the-district candidates may be affected by accountability pressures or the 
resource level in high-needs schools, but current teachers’ revealed preferences agree with those 
previously found in the research literature.  
It has also been found that a teacher’s compatibility with a school can affect their ability 
to improve student outcomes and their own satisfaction (which decreases mobility, thereby 
increasing experience and decreasing turnover costs). In my third chapter, I use a laboratory 
experiment to examine teacher and school behavior and their effects on outcomes in a controlled 
setting while varying the preference structure of the market and the information agents have on 
competitors’ actions. I find that information on competitor behavior affects signaling behavior 
and the market efficiency and payoffs, but that these effects are dependent on the preference 
structure. I also find that the preference structure affects the stability of the matches.   
                                                 
1 Darling-Hammond, 2001; Viadero, 2002; Gordon & Maxey, 2000; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Feng & Sass, 2017 
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There are many possible avenues for improving teacher quality, including pre-service 
training, professional development, performance-based compensation, and selective retention. 
While these mechanisms have been studied extensively, until recently there has been little 
attention paid to another potentially efficient means of raising teacher quality: improving the 
system for selecting and hiring teachers.  In this dissertation, I research three aspects of teacher 
hiring that could be adjusted to promote education quality, if they were better understood. The 
first chapter examines how principals make hiring decisions. The second chapter uses teacher job 
applications as a tool to understand teacher preferences over place of employment. These 
chapters are both empirical works applicant and employment data for an Atlanta metropolitan 
area school district. The third chapter utilizes a lab experiment designed to provide preliminary 
evidence regarding the effects of information on competitor behavior in a school district’s hiring 
process on signaling investment and the match outcomes between schools and teachers.  
In the first chapter, I investigate principals’ decisions during the hiring process.  Hiring 
the most productive workers is paramount in service sectors where human resources are the 
primary input. This is particularly true in education, where teachers are the most important factor 
in promoting student achievement and turnover is considerable, which in turn leads to substantial 
hiring on a persistent basis. I study the hiring decisions of principals using data on applicants for 
teaching positions in a mid-sized urban school district. I compare characteristics of teaching 
candidates that are associated with a higher likelihood of receiving a job offer with those that 
enhance productivity as a teacher. Similar to other recent work, I find multiple instances where 
the factors driving hiring decisions do not align with the factors associated with teacher 
productivity. Other studies infer this misalignment is due to a lack of information or incorrect 
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choices on the part of principals and suggest an appropriate policy response would be to provide 
better information to principals or to reduce principal discretion and centralize hiring decisions.  
In contrast, I account for the fact that work environments differ across schools and thus different 
principals face de-facto different pools of teaching candidates. I find that the quality of the pool 
may affect principal decisions, but that the pool does not systematically vary by school 
characteristics within the system in an obvious manner. 
In the second chapter, I study how differences in teacher preferences can affect the 
variation in makeup of the applicant pool across schools. Given the importance of teachers in 
determining student outcomes, policymakers are concerned that teacher sorting across schools 
may limit access to high-quality teachers for minority, impoverished, or low-performing 
students. Teacher sorting may occur in the new teacher labor market (Sass, et al. 2012) as well as 
through post-hire differential patterns of teacher mobility.2 It is possible that disparities in access 
to high-quality teachers can be mitigated by targeted hiring and retention policies.3 I restructure 
the data used in Chapter 1 to represent the choice set of the teachers. I implement a conditional 
logistic model to estimate the impacts of school characteristics on prospective and current 
teachers’ application likelihoods. I find evidence that the applicants who are new to the district 
may be attracted to high-needs schools which may have greater resources. However, the 
application probabilities of current teachers coincide with the findings of prior research.  
Outside of a teachers’ baseline ability, their school compatibility (Jackson 2013) and 
experience4 also affects their ability to improve student outcomes. Teacher satisfaction within a 
                                                 
2 Darling-Hammond 2001; Viadero 2002; Gordon and Maxey 2000; Goldhaber, Gross, and Player 2007; Feng and Sass 2017 
3 Adnot, Dee, Katz, and Wycoff 2017 
4 Chingos and Peterson 2011; Staiger and Rockoff 2010; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kane 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2006; 
Dobbie 2011; Wiswall 2013; Papay and Kraft 2015; Rockoff 2004 
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school leads to prolonged tenure, which naturally increases experience. Extending the length of 
time a teacher remains in a school also decreases the pecuniary and non-pecuniary turnover costs 
to schools.5 Therefore, in attempting to provide quality education, it is imperative to understand 
how the hiring process affects teacher-school matches. My third chapter utilizes a laboratory 
experiment to examine teacher and school behavior. This is a simplified teacher labor market 
modeled through a two-sided matching markets framework. I introduce information asymmetry 
by making teacher quality unknown to employers. Teachers then signal their quality through a 
costly signal, either simultaneously or sequentially, where later applicants observe prior 
signaling investment amounts. In addition, I examine two preferences rankings to ensure the 
effects found are not driven by the enforced preferences. The matching procedure School Hiring 
(SH), designed by mimicking a current hiring policy of a metropolitan Atlanta school district 
hiring process, is very similar to the Priority (Boston) matching procedure. I find that the effects 
of participants having additional information on competitor investment amounts and participant 
payoffs are dependent on the structure of the preferences, In addition, the information treatment 
decreases the portion of the time that investments are type revealing. The market stability is 
unaffected by the information treatment, but is higher when the preferences of participating 
agents are homogenous. 
                                                 
5 Milanowski and Odden 2007; Guin 2004 
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1 Missed Opportunities or Making the Best of Bad Situations? Principal 
Selection of Teacher Applicants 
1.1 Introduction 
Creating the best match between employees and employers has long been shown to 
improve productivity, satisfaction, and employee tenure (Liu & Johnson, 2006; Koch & 
McGrath, 1996). To create successful matches, both job seekers and firms must gather 
information regarding their counterparts in order to choose an optimal employment match. 
However, existing research regarding employers’ search for employees is somewhat limited, 
particularly regarding the reasons and beliefs informing hiring decisions in the public sector.  
 This paper examines employer search in the context of the public school teacher labor 
market in a mid-size urban school district. As the teaching profession is one wherein the quality 
of workers substantially affects the benefits accrued by their students, both short-run academic 
achievement and labor market outcomes as adults, the characteristics of the labor market are of 
considerable policy importance (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 
2007; Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2008; Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2014). 
Given that researchers have demonstrated the ability of careful hiring to improve the average 
worker’s productivity in several professions, and that teaching is a profession with substantial 
amounts of employee turnover (Darling-Hammond, 2001; Viadero, 2002) and, therefore, 
persistent hiring, improving the teacher-hiring process could significantly impact the quality of 
employees in this field. Compared to other school-based methods used to improve teacher 
performance (performance pay, selective retention, and professional development) employing 
hiring as a policy lever to promote performance has potential advantages, such as fewer 
implementation barriers or being more cost effective. 
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Furthermore, preventing sub-par teacher hires is crucial as there are significant barriers to 
removing low-performing teachers (Griffith & McDougald, 2016; Painter, 2000; Levin et al., 
Schunck, 2005), and those students taught by the low-performing teachers are permanently 
affected by their teachers’ relative lack of performance quality. Studying the teacher labor 
market is also particularly advantageous for research on employer search, as schools collect 
productivity measures of those hired so that the quality of the employer's choice can be 
evaluated.  
There are constraints on a principal’s ability to hire the best teacher; these barriers, if 
acknowledged, could potentially be circumvented in order to ultimately improve hiring 
outcomes. For example, the hiring process may not provide enough information for principals to 
identify superior teachers (Liu & Johnson, 2006; Donaldson, 2013; Neild et al., 2003; 
DeArmond et al., 2010; Bruno & Strunk, 2019; Jacob et al., 2018), or the principals may not use 
the information they have (Jacob et al., 2018; Bruno & Strunk, 2019). A principal could be too 
inexperienced with the hiring process to successfully find and hire the best candidate (Loeb et 
al., 2012; Dipboy & Jackson, 1999). In addition, teacher salary schedules are often fixed, so 
superior teachers may seek higher paying employment in other fields or districts (Imazeki, 2005; 
Feng, 2014; Feng, 2009). Procedural barriers also exist that may inhibit a principal’s ability to 
hire superior teacher candidates: late leave notices, insufficient human resources staff, and delays 
associated with collective bargaining and belated budgets (e.g. Levin & Quinn, 2003; Liu et al., 
2008; Strunk et al., 2018; Levin et al., 2005; Odden & Kelley, 2008; Campbell et al., 2004; Bassi 
& McMurrer, 2007; Flandez, 2009; Grensing-Pophal, 2017; Ryan et al., 2000; Converse et al., 
2004). In addition to these constraints, principals also work in a non-profit sector so they may 
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make choices to maximize their own utility rather that to maximize educational output, such as 
selecting teachers with amenable personalities regardless of quality.  
Jacob et al. (2018) and Bruno and Strunk (2019) study principal hiring choices in 
Washington, DC and Los Angeles, CA, respectively. The two papers employ a similar strategy; 
they use pooled district-wide data to estimate both the relationship between candidate 
characteristics and the likelihood of being hired and the relationship between candidate 
characteristics and subsequent teacher performance. They then compare the factors that are 
correlated with hiring and the factors that are associated with teacher performance. These two 
papers find that some candidate information and hiring procedures correlate with teacher 
performance; however, discrepancies between the predictors of principal hiring decisions and the 
predictors of teacher performance suggest that principals may not be making the best hiring 
decisions and thus there may be room for improvement in the teacher hiring process. 
The use of pooled district-wide data in previous studies to compare the factors driving 
hiring decisions with those determining teacher performance appear to be a function of data 
availability. In the case of the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), prospective teachers 
could apply for a recommendation through a centralized process called TeachDC, or they could 
apply directly to a school.  During the period studied by Jacob, et al. (2011-2013), about half of 
new hires came from candidates in the TeachDC system.  Jacob and co-authors only had access 
to applications submitted through TeachDC and could not observe candidates who applied 
directly to individual schools.  They examined the relationship between scores on the 
components of the recommendation, as well as getting recommended, on the probability of being 
hired and eventual performance as a teacher. In the Los Angeles Unified School District 
(LAUSD), all applications for teaching were submitted through a centralized application system. 
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Neither Jacob et al. or Bruno and Strunk indicate that applicants to the centralized system could 
indicate preferences for a particular school or schools. Yet both papers make clear that no matter 
how applications were initially received, hiring decisions were decentralized. In both DCPS and 
LAUSD, principals or other site administrators decided which candidates would be offered a 
teaching position. 
Pooling data across schools makes the implicit assumption that every principal within a 
given district has access to the same teacher applicant pool and that candidates have no outside 
options. Even though all teachers who meet the district standards might be in a single “available” 
pool (as in LAUSD), the de-facto applicant pool could be still vary widely between schools, 
based on teacher preferences and opportunity costs. In this paper I consider not only the district-
wide pool of prospective teachers, but also the pool of candidates who apply for a position at a 
particular school.  
This research delves into factors that may lead an apparent discrepancy between the 
candidate who is expected to be the most effective teacher and the candidate actually selected by 
the principal, previously interpreted as principals making poor hiring decisions. Each possible 
factor has a significantly different policy implication, which will be included in the policy 
discussion section. Principals must compete against each other in order to hire quality 
candidates, which causes principals to be uncertain of being able to successfully hire a candidate. 
Aspects of this competition between principals, such as attractiveness of one’s position and the 
loss of potential alternate candidates while waiting for the outcome of an extant offer, means 
principals may make strategic selections regarding which candidate to attempt to hire.  
As this research seeks to go beyond prior district-wide analyses, I first establish that there 
are differences between the hiring and performance predictions for the studied school district as a 
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whole, in similar manner as the prior work by Jacob et al. and Bruno and Strunk. In contrast to 
prior work, which measures actual hires, I consider the earlier decision of initiating a request to 
offer a position to a candidate. This change in approach allows the choices of the teacher and the 
district to be disentangled from the decisions of the principal. Jacob et al. also examined offer 
choices briefly, but found it had few differences from hires and thus did not examine the decision 
closely. In addition to disentangling the applicant choice like the offer does, the hiring request 
decision also precludes the district rejecting the principal’s choice. 
I also analyze the systemic variation in the applicant pool and how this variation may 
affect the relationship between characteristics of the candidate pool and the selected candidate, 
while controlling for position, school, and principal characteristics. Given that college GPA 
predicts multiple measures of teacher performance in my teacher quality estimations, I use it as 
my measure of candidate quality.6 Then I directly estimate the relationship between pool 
characteristics and selected teacher candidate quality. Since the applicant pool may affect the 
principals’ decisions, I then use conditional logistic specifications to estimate the principals’ 
hiring decisions in the context of the pools of applicants available to them.  
When I follow the approach of prior researchers and pool all candidates districtwide, I 
find that principals over-select transfer candidates as well as those candidates with education 
majors or teaching certification, while also under-selecting candidates with high college GPAs 
and those who on average apply quickly after the position is posted. As GPA is a non-malleable 
characteristic of job candidates that seems to be indicative of superior teacher performance on 
several measures, it is a good candidate for use in a screening policy based on these initial 
                                                 
6 This is a strong assumption but characterizing teacher quality has always been difficult.  In my analysis of the relationship 
between candidate characteristics and teacher performance, college GPA is the most consistent statistically significant predictor. 
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results. However, when examining how the characteristics contextualizing the hiring decision 
(the school, the principal, the subject, the applicant pool) relate to the college GPA of the 
selected, I find that schools with better and larger applicant pools select candidates with higher 
college GPAs. This result suggests that variation in principals’ offer decisions could be driven in 
part by differences between applicant pools.  
Furthermore, when controlling for different applicant pools using conditional logistic 
regression, I find that teaching certification, education majors (for only the new sample), and 
finding a job through another district employee, no longer affect hiring-request decisions, and 
thus no longer present a contradiction between their estimated impacts on hiring requests and 
performance indicators. This finding suggests that a portion of the apparent mismatch is due to 
assuming that all principals within a district face the same applicant pool. However, these results 
may be the result of statistical noise. 
This research contributes to the employer search literature through additional empirical 
analysis of employer decision-making when applicant pools are endogenous and hiring managers 
compete for quality applicants. In addition, this research focuses on identifying why a principal 
might select candidates who do not appear to the best qualified, while previous research on 
principal hiring decisions implicitly assumes the selection and performance misalignment results 
entirely from the principal’s lack of information or poor choices. Finally, rather than measure 
employment outcomes, which are a function of both employment offers and candidate 
acceptances, this research analyzes principals’ hiring requests, data on which have not previously 
been available. The advantage of this approach is that it isolates employer decision making, 
whereas employment outcomes are a function of employer (principal), organization (district), 
and candidate decisions.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
As this paper studies factors which can influence hiring decisions, the literature review 
discusses the existing relevant research regarding the decisions hiring managers make and 
various aspects of the hiring process. This includes a brief review of the employer search 
literature. Then the research on how hiring manager choices are affected by the uncertainty over 
a candidate’s commitment to the firm (either prospective tenure or willingness to accept an offer) 
and competition over quality candidates. In addition, the research on how applicant pools can 
differ will be reviewed. This section will finish with a discussion of the existing research on the 
information that influences hiring managers’ decisions and the prior findings on how principals 
use information, as well as my contributions to these research areas.  
Most of the empirical employer search literature has focused on vacancy duration (e.g., 
Andrews et al., 2008; van Ours & Ridder. 1991; Barron et al., 1987; Gorter et al. 1996) or 
recruitment and screening methods (e.g. Murphy, 1986; Barron et al. 1985; Holzer, 1987; Russo 
et al., 2000; DeVaro, 2005; Hoffman, et al., 2018; Burks, et al. 2015; Barling et al. 2009). Much 
of the research on employer candidate selection has been theoretical or experimental, especially 
in situations where employers compete for high-quality candidates, and each firm has an 
endogenous sets of applicants (Spence 1973; Immorlica et al., 2006; Vanderbei 2012; 
Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005; Ergin & Sönmez, 2006; Chen & 
Sönmez, 2006; Galperin et al., 2019). Outside of studying employee referrals, there has been 
relatively little empirical analysis of the reasoning firms use to select a given candidate (Coles et 
al., 2010; Fahr & Sunde, 2001).  
To understand how a hiring manager’s perceptions of a candidate’s commitment to a firm 
affect hiring decisions, Galperin et al. (2019) conducted an online experiment. They find that 
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hiring managers trade some amount of candidate capability for perceived organizational 
commitment. Commitment takes the form of valuing the firm more or staying with the firm 
longer. They did not find evidence that the choice of candidate was affected by the manager’s 
beliefs regarding offer acceptance.  
Although a candidate’s probability of accepting an offer had no effect on the hiring 
managers’ decisions in Galperin et al. (2019), its affects have been shown in other hiring 
situations. In theoretical labor markets covered under the umbrella of “Secretary Games,” 
employers compete against each other for high-quality candidates. The research in this area finds 
that competition results in earlier offers, and can also lead to the use of “exploding offers” (offers 
that candidates are given a short time frame to consider) in order to pressure better candidates to 
accept (Immorlica et al., 2006; Vanderbei 2012; Fahr & Sunde 2001).  
The literature on how to match two pools of people, such as matching employers to 
employees, called the Matching Markets literature, shows several circumstances where a 
participant may not choose their top candidate as part of a strategic choice. In particular, hiring 
managers have a rank-ordered list of candidates regarding quality; however, each candidate also 
has an acceptance probability. Hiring managers may issue offers to candidates lower on the 
quality ranking who have higher acceptance probabilities to minimize the risk of losing certain 
employee candidates.  
A set of studies that analyze how Boston public schools matched students to schools 
demonstrates strategic selection in a matching market. Students were assigned a school at which 
they had priority acceptance and were then asked to rank all the schools according to where they 
would most like to attend. Students who strategically ranked their schools (listed the best schools 
they could enter first) got into better schools compared to those who ranked schools strictly 
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according to where they would prefer to attend (Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003; 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005; Ergin & Sönmez, 2006; Chen & Sönmez, 2006).  
In the economics academic job market, a similar phenomenon happens. Employee 
candidates apply to a large number of positions, but universities have a limited number of 
interview slots. The universities could easily fill all their interview slots with top candidates, but 
these top candidates have low chances of accepting if they are eventually given an offer. So the 
universities act strategically and assign some of their interview spots to less appealing candidates 
who have a higher likelihood of later accepting an offer (Coles et al., 2010).  
Employer search is partially a function of the pool of candidates who applied to the job. 
A firm cannot select the best candidate if the candidate never applies. However, applicant pools 
can endogenously vary between jobs and locations. For example, Manning (2000) found that 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the job affect the number of applicants to a vacancy for 
low-wage jobs. For teachers trying to match to jobs, Boyd et al. (2013) finds teachers strongly 
prefer certain non-pecuniary aspects of schools, including location and student demographics. 
These teacher preferences can cause considerable variations among schools in the pools of 
applicants they select from. A great deal of additional research demonstrates that the preferences 
of already-employed teachers are consistent with the applicants’ preferences found in Boyd et al. 
(2013) (e.g. Sass et al., 2012; Levin & Quinn, 2003; Liu et al., 2008; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; 
Boyd et al., 2011; Lankford et al., 2002; Imazeki, 2005; Scafidi et al., 2007).  
In addition to the external factors in hiring, hiring managers must also be able to discern 
candidate quality using the information they gather. Hiring managers have access to candidate-
supplied information from applications and resumes. The hiring managers may also gather 
information through their professional networks and by conducting candidate interviews. This 
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private information is the most interesting and also the most troublesome. The sheer amount of 
research on the importance of the interview to information gathering and decision-making is 
staggering. This voluminous research points yields two broad conclusions. First, the interview is 
heavily relied on by hiring managers (e.g. Rutledge et al., 2008; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). 
Second, hiring managers who ignore firm-based screens of candidates in favor of their interview 
results often hire lower performing candidates (Dipboye & Jackson, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2018).  
This reliance on interviews is often explained as the hiring manager being biased or mistaken in 
their information usage. Another source of private information is a hiring manger’s professional 
network. This informal information gathering is hard to capture, so the research has mainly 
focused on employee referrals. Several studies find that hiring managers use referrals to decrease 
the uncertainty regarding the candidate’s acceptance of a job offer and tenure with the firm 
(Dustmann et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2015).  
Two papers have examined how principal information usage in the hiring decisions 
compares to the information related to teacher quality, Jacob et al. (2018) and Bruno and Strunk 
(2019). Jacob et al. (2018), studies the effects of Washington DC Public School’s 2011 
implementation of a recommendation process. Teacher candidates participated voluntarily, and 
those who took part completed several screens (e.g., interviews, sample lessons, and written 
assessments). Then a recommended list containing candidates who passed every screen was 
distributed to principals, as was all the information gathered during the process. The authors find 
that while principals use the recommendation in their hiring decisions, they do not use the 
component scores that determine recommendation status. They also find that the candidate 
characteristics that are correlated with teacher performance are not the same characteristics as 
those that are associated with principal hiring decisions.  In some cases characteristics that are 
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positively associated with better teacher performance (e.g. SAT scores and college GPAs) are 
actually negatively correlated with the probability of being hired. These results suggest that 
principals undervalue some attributes that are indicative of superior teacher performance. If true, 
this suggests that modifying the selection process could improve the average quality of hired 
teachers.  
Bruno and Strunk (2019) analyzes the teacher hiring process in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District. The researchers find that the overall score on a multi-component screening 
system predicts principal hiring decisions, teacher attendance, teacher impact on student test 
scores, and teacher evaluation scores, but not teacher retention within the district. However, the 
way individual components of the screening system correlate with the teacher quality measures 
varies considerably, highlighting the potential multi-dimensionality of teacher quality. Bruno and 
Strunk find that the adoption of the screening system as a whole improves teacher quality in the 
district relative to the average quality of teachers in similar districts. They also find that while the 
scores on screens are predictive of some teacher outcomes, they are not strongly correlated with 
hiring decisions, echoing the findings in Jacob et al. (2018). 
This paper expands on the extant hiring research in several ways. Few researchers have 
had access to all job applications, hiring requests, and performance outcomes of hired workers, 
particularly for public-sector occupations. This paper, using unique data, adds to the empirical 
research on employer search and decision making under competition with endogenous applicant 
pools. The previous principal hiring-decision research established that there is misalignment 
between statistical predictors of principal hiring choices and teacher performance at the district 
level (Jacob et al., 2018; Bruno & Strunk, 2019). The current paper seeks to understand why 
these misalignments may occur and determine if they are they are the result of poor decisions by 
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principals. First, I will determine if the districtwide misalignments uncovered in Los Angeles and 
Washington, DC also occur in the district I study. Second, I will investigate whether there is 
significant variation in the pools of candidates that schools attract and whether the misalignment 
between candidate characteristics that are associated with teacher quality and the traits that 
predict whether a principal makes a request to hire a candidate continue to appear when 
comparisons are made at the school level rather than at the district level.  
1.3 The Studied School District 
1.3.1 The School District’s Hiring Process 
For the past several years, the studied school district, located in the Atlanta metropolitan-
area, implemented a series of changes intended to improve the teacher hiring process. Before 
these changes, teacher candidates would apply online to the district for open positions, and then 
the district simply conducted a background and credential check before posting a candidate’s 
information to a hiring portal that is accessible to principals. In December 2015, the district 
initiated the use of the GALLUP TeacherInsight exam, which was meant to check the 
candidate’s compatibility with the school district. The Human Resources (HR) department set 70 
out of 100 to be a passing score on the GALLUP assessment and encouraged principals to hire 
candidates with a passing score. Initially, however, candidates were not required to complete the 
test to be considered for a position, and principals did not have to limit their selection to 
candidates with a passing score. In January 2019, passing the test became a requirement to enter 
the teacher candidate pool.  
In January 2017, following a pilot period, the district introduced a video interview tool, 
HireVue. Candidates were not required to submit a video, and completing a HireVue interview 
continues to be voluntary. Beginning the next year, in 2018, a group of 24 trained teacher-leaders 
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started scoring the video interviews on a five-point scale, though the scoring was only for 
candidates applying before the end of May. The HR Department then posts both the video and 
the accompanying score to the hiring portal. Principals were encouraged to select candidates with 
a score of three or above. The present analysis does not include the HireVue scores due to the 
limited number currently available.  
The principals may interview any qualified candidate once the applicant's information is 
posted to the hiring portal. They are able to view the candidate information for any applicant to 
the school system though they can also filter their views to only those candidates who applied to 
their school. However, before starting the process to hire a candidate, the principal must have the 
candidate submit a school-specific application if they had not already done so (candidates can 
initially apply to generic openings, like “middle school math teacher”). The vast majority of 
candidates did apply prior to their selection for a hiring request. Once the principal has selected a 
candidate, they then send an official request to HR to hire the candidate. If HR approves the 
request, they issue a formal offer to the applicant. The applicant is then free to accept or reject 
the offer. There is no official limit on the number of days a candidate can take to respond; 
however, principals can withdraw the offer.  
In addition to the implementation of new screeners, the district also adjusted the 
requirements, the content, or both the content and requirements of several questions in the 
teacher candidate application in January 2019. These changes were done based on 
recommendations from the Metropolitan Atlanta Policy Lab for Education research team. All 
changes were designed to improve the information available to principals and improve the 
quality of data for future research.  
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1.3.2 Measures of Teacher Quality 
Evaluating the efficacy of the principal’s ability to identify and select quality teachers 
during the teacher hiring process requires a measure of teacher quality. Since there is no 
consensus on an ideal teacher quality metric, I utilize several measures, including official teacher 
evaluations scores, student growth percentiles (SGPs), a teacher’s continued employment in their 
initial school or the district, and the percent of the year the teacher is present or in staff 
development. Because SGPs are only calculated for teachers in tested grades and subjects, the 
sample size for analyzing the relation between candidate characteristics and Mean Student 
Growth Percentile is relatively small; results should be considered in the context of this 
limitation. For simplicity, the phrase “teacher quality” refers to these measures as a whole.  
The official teacher evaluation system in Georgia is the Teacher Keys Evaluation System 
(TKES). The TKES score is comprised of several components. The first component is the 
teacher’s median SGP score, when available, and the mean SGP score for the school when a 
teacher’s subject is not tested. SGPs measure the year-to-year growth in student achievement 
relative to that of students with similar prior test scores. The other two components are an 
evaluation of how the teacher followed their prescribed teacher growth plan and the teacher’s 
score on a set of classroom observations from a credentialed evaluator, generally the principal.  
The remaining measures have a less direct connection to student outcomes, and all 
represent a type of persistence in the school. A teacher staying in the school or district is 
beneficial as it prevents the costs of teacher departure (Milanowski & Odden, 2007) and 
mechanically increases teacher experience, which has been shown to improve student outcomes 
(Chingos & Peterson, 2011; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; Rivkin, et al., 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, & 
Vigdor, 2006; Dobbie, 2001; Wiswall, 2013; Papay & Kraft, 2015; Rockoff, 2004). All else 
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equal among candidates, teachers with high rates of absenteeism are less desirable. This is 
because teacher absences are disruptive to student learning and require that the absent teacher is 
temporarily replaced with an often-less-effective substitute teacher, which can be a time 
consuming and costly process. The negative effect of teacher absenteeism on students has been 
documented in Miller et al. (2008), Coltfelter et al. (2009), and Gershenson (2016), and been 
shown to particularly affect schools serving primarily disadvantaged students. For this research, 
teacher attendance is defined as the portion of contractual employment days a teacher is present 
or in staff development.  
1.3.3 The Data 
The Metropolitan Atlanta Policy Lab for Education (MAPLE) provided the data for this 
research. MAPLE has a data-sharing agreement in place with five partner school districts in the 
Atlanta Metro Area. For this project, the researcher was allowed access to student performance, 
demographics, attendance, and discipline records, teacher attendance, employment, and 
evaluation records, and principal employment and evaluation records for school years 2015/16, 
2016/17, and 2017/18. In addition, the studied district provided rich application and hiring 
decision data for the period between December 2015 and May 2018, which includes the bulk of 
hiring for school years 2016/17 through 2018/19.  All applications were shared with the 
researcher, not just those selected for a hiring request or subsequent hires. The candidate 
information recorded in the applications includes their education, work history, student teaching 
experience, certification status, address, and scores on the district screening tools. Also, I further 
confirmed previous work experience within the district using the basic personnel files of the 
studied district for school years 1999-2000 through 2017-2018.  
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1.3.4 The Analysis Sample 
The underlying supply and demand for teachers can vary across subject areas. For 
example, special education, secondary math and science, and foreign languages are typically 
considered “hard-to-staff” areas (Feng & Sass, 2017). Also, teachers may be hired for their 
ability to coach a sports team, rather than for their instructional skills in academic subjects. To 
minimize issues related to specialized positions while maintaining statistical power, the research 
removes any candidates who only applied to physical education, career, technical, and 
agricultural education, gifted education, foreign languages, special education, art, or remediation 
positions from the sample.  
In each year, the district employs close to 4000 teachers and must fill approximately 600 
open teaching positions, including roughly 150 that are filled by internal hires. These openings 
together attract approximately 7000 unique candidates. This number includes many candidates 
who do not complete their applications and many who submit multiple applications. For the 
analysis of hiring decision misalignment with teacher performance, following Bruno and Strunk 
(2019) and Jacob et al. (2018), each applicant has one observation per year they applied. Each 
observation consists of the candidate’s characteristics, the subjects,7 and school levels the 
candidate applied to, their number of applications, and whether they were requested for hire. 
Then for all those hired, the observation also includes the candidate’s performance data, the 
characteristics of the principal who oversaw the candidate during their school year of 
employment, and some attributes of the school at which the candidate taught. These elements are 
also included when examining other factors that lead to the observed differences between the 
hiring and performance predictions. The sample consists of observations at the 
                                                 
7 General Elementary, Math, Science, ELA, and Social Studies 
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applicant/school/subject level/year level (e.g.  a person who applies to middle-school math 
positions in schools A and B and to middle-school science positions at schools B and C in March 
2016 would have generate four observations.)  For this purposes of this paper, general 
elementary teachers are being categorized as a subject. This is meant to mimic application-level 
observations, but in a manner that permits merging the application and hiring request data. Often 
the job titles specified in the application and the hiring request do not perfectly match. This is 
especially true at the elementary level where a teacher may apply to teach fourth grade, but only 
a hire for third grade occurs. The information in every observation includes the applicant, 
position, and school characteristics, as well as the following outcomes: (i) whether the school 
submitted a request to hire that applicant in the specified subject, (ii) if the request succeeded, 
and (iii) the performance of the teacher candidate during their first year if they were hired.  
When comparing the hired candidates’ characteristics with those of the entire candidate 
pool, a greater portion of those hired are certified, did their student-teaching in the district, or 
were previously district employees. Those hired were also more likely to have found the job 
through a district employee, possess an advanced degree, possess an education major, or applied 
to a non-core academic position. Those hired also had higher college grade point averages, 
higher GALLUP scores, and applied to more jobs. The characteristics of the applicants and hired 
candidates are reported in Table 1.1. In the performance regressions the attributes of the school 
and the principal at which the teacher taught are also taken into account, these characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1.2.  
Not all of the 1443 hiring requests led to a candidate being hired, many are rejected by 
the by the requested candidate or the district. Of the 1,128 hired candidates, 743 were officially 
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evaluated according to the Georgia Teacher Keys of Effectiveness System.8 The official 
evaluation is scored on a scale of zero to thirty and hired candidates averaged a score of 19.9 
points. Mean Student Growth Percentile is only available for a much smaller sample number of 
teachers (245), since not all subjects and grades are tested. The candidates received an average 
SGP score of 47.7. A total of 803 hired candidates are observed entering a district school,9 63.5 
percent of whom remain in their school for a second year of employment. The district as a whole 
retained 69.0 percent of the 922 candidates who entered employment somewhere in the district.10 
For the 884 hired teacher candidates with attendance data, were present for work for 96.1 percent 
of their contractual employment days on average. More details regarding the hiring and 
performance outcomes of the candidates are reported in Table 1.3. For all other teachers in the 
district, their average official evaluation score was slightly higher at 21.1 points, as were there 
SGP scores at 49.7, a school retention rate of 68.9 percent, a district retention rate of 75.6 
percent. The other teachers in the district did have slightly lower attendance of 95.3 percent of 
their contractual employment days.  
1.4 Methods 
1.4.1 Poor Decision Making? 
For the first portion of the analysis, I follow the approach employed in previous research 
and focus on the principals’ use of available information on the prospective teachers in the hiring 
decision. I determine which candidate characteristics are correlated with the teacher performance 
measures discussed previously. Similarly, I estimate the correlation between the same candidate 
                                                 
8 Not all teachers appear in the evaluation data.  
9 Hired in this paper are those marked as hired in the HR data, but there is melt between that confirmation and starting at the 
school. This is why there is a difference between the number of teachers entering a school and number hired.  
10 Teachers in this data set are structured as hired to a specific school but some teachers are hired but enter a different school in 
the district that the one they are reported as hired to.  
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characteristics and the likelihood of being selected for a hiring request by a principal. I then 
compare the extent to which the factors influencing hiring requests align with the characteristics 
correlated with teacher quality. If there are observable candidate characteristics that predict later 
performance but do not influence hiring requests, it suggests that principals may not be fully 
utilizing available information and thus making “poor decisions.” Principals could also be 
making poor choices if they base their hiring decisions on candidate characteristics which are 
unrelated to future teacher performance.  
1.4.1.1 Identifying Quality Teachers 
To give context to a principal’s decision, the predictors of teacher quality must be 
identified first. To do this, I estimate a multivariate regression model of teacher quality. In the 
model, teacher quality is a function of the teacher’s observable characteristics and other possible 
factors. The estimation takes the following form: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜑𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗                      (1) 
where subscript i denotes the teacher, subscript j denotes the school, and subscript t denotes the 
year. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the teacher quality measure and, depending on the measure in question, can either be 
continuous, binary, or a fraction. The form of the outcome variable dictates the exact regression 
functional form used, either linear, probit, or fractional probit. 𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of whether 
the candidate was hired or not. Since the teacher quality measures can only be observed for the 
hired candidates, the estimations only include the sample of candidates who are hired. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
set of candidate characteristics that the principal can see during the hiring process such as highest 
degree attained, district screening scores, college grade point average, certifications held, student 
teaching assignments, and previous work experience. The model also controls for the number of 
application submissions, average speed of application, and whether a candidate applied to any 
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positions in non-core subjects. 𝑆𝑗𝑡 is the set of school attributes, such as the percentage of 
students directly certified (a measure of the proportion of students who are economically 
disadvantaged in the school), the percentage of students of a given race or gender, the school’s 
college and career readiness index, or the Georgia Department of Education assigned school 
report card grade indicators. 𝜑𝑡𝑗 is the set of characteristics of the principal overseeing the 
teacher during the evaluation period. The principal characteristics include the principal’s official 
state evaluation score, experience, and race and gender interacted with the teacher’s race and 
gender. The characteristics of the principal are included in the model due to the extensive 
research on the effects of the presiding principal on the various measures of quality being used in 
the analysis. Specifically, a teacher’s decision to remain in a school (teacher retention), their 
satisfaction with their school, and their performance. As there is evidence of principal’s effects 
on teachers, not including their characteristics would allow additional possibilities of omitted 
variable bias (assuming that teachers sort into schools in part based on perceptions of the quality 
of school principals). The parameters of interest are the vector of coefficients 𝛽1, which provide 
the partial correlations between the candidate characteristics and teacher quality. This estimation 
does not control for selection into being hired for two reasons. First, there was no sufficiently 
exogenous instrumental variable to use in a Heckman selection model. Second, prior work 
(Jacob et al., 2018 and Goldhaber et al., 2017) found little difference in estimates in the models 
with and without corrections for selection.  
1.4.1.2 Identifying Principal Hiring Decisions 
The principal’s hiring request decision is estimated using a probit regression due to the 
binary nature of the decision. The decision to place a hiring request is modeled as the function of 
the candidate’s observable characteristics, and takes the following form: 
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𝑃𝑟(ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) = 𝜑(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡)         (2) 
where ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of whether the candidate was the subject of any principal’s 
hiring request. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the same set of observable candidate characteristics used in the 
teacher quality estimations. 𝛽1 are the parameters of interest, as they provide the partial 
correlations between teacher candidate characteristics and the principals’ hiring decisions. The 
estimation is also completed with the outcome of hired for the full sample. 
1.4.2 Or Making the Best of Bad Situations? 
While a district-level misalignment between the candidate characteristics affecting hiring 
decisions and those associated with later teacher performance could be indicative of poor 
decision making by principals, I argue that mis-alignment at the district level could also reflect 
differences in the pool of candidates that principals can choose from and the likelihood a 
candidate will accept an offer of employment from a particular school. This section addresses the 
estimation methods employed to account for variation in the applicant pools. Due to 
identification difficulties,11 there are no models specifically identifying the effects of applicant 
acceptance probabilities on the hiring decisions. 
1.4.2.1 Demonstrating the Differences in Candidate Pools across Schools 
In this paper, I demonstrate that principals face considerable variation in the applicant 
pool for an open teaching position. I first examine the mean and variation of the number of 
candidates and the portion of candidates in the top quintile of GPA for all applicants within and 
between key aspects of the school and job. These aspects are the school's state-issued grade, 
number of students, grade level (elementary/middle/high), incidence of students from low-
                                                 
11 I could determine no reliable way to estimate acceptance probabilities, and thus account for their effects of principal decision 
making. At most, I could make a strong assumption that more talented teachers are less likely to accept at qualitatively more 
difficult schools. But this was determined to strong and too noisy. 
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income households, and the academic subject of the position. The continuous variables are 
binned to create categories. Then, I determine if both the size and quality of the candidate pool 
are systematically related to school quality. To do this, I estimate linear regressions where the 
dependent variable is either the size of the applicant pool for a position (measured by the number 
of applicants) or the quality of the pool (measured by the proportion of applicants with college 
GPAs in the top quintile of the districtwide distribution of candidates).12 Explanatory variables 
include a subset of school, subject, and principal characteristics used in equation (1). This takes 
the following form: 
Outcomei=βi School Level +αi School Characteristics +γi Subject +ψi School*Subject+  
λi Principal Characteristics + єi                        (3) 
1.4.2.2 Relation of the Applicant Pool to Selected Candidate Quality 
After estimating whether that candidate pools vary systematically across school-subjects, 
I study if the differences in available prospective teachers influence principal hiring request 
decisions. To do this, I regress the college GPA of selected applicants (a measure of candidate 
quality) on aspects of the applicant pool. Then I add further controls for a collection of job, 
school, and principal characteristics which may also affect the ways principals perceive 
acceptance probabilities and thereby influence the minimum acceptable candidate quality. In the 
estimations, I analyze both the sample of first-selected candidates and the full set of selected 
candidates with an additional control for request order.  
                                                 
12 GPA was selected because it is a readily observable characteristic of prospective teachers that has been shown to be predictive 
of teacher performance (Jacob et al., 2018). 
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1.4.2.3 Contextual Effects of the Applicant Pool on Selection 
The analyses described in the two previous sub-sections are intended to determine if there 
are differences in the candidate pools and if these differences affect who is selected for a hiring 
request. The analysis in this section is intended to determine estimating the decision within the 
principals’ specific for the hiring pool affects estimates of the weight that principals place on 
various candidate characteristics.  
I compare the estimates of the hiring-request decision from the initial probit specification, 
which assumes all principals face the same pool, to estimates from a conditional logit model, 
which accounts for each principal facing different candidate pools. Conditional logit is a 
particular form of general discrete choice models where an individual is faced with J options to 
choose from, with each option yielding a particular level of utility. Individuals are assumed to 
choose the option that maximizes their utility. In the typical multinomial logit model approach, 
the expected utilities of the options are modeled as a function of the characteristics of the 
individuals making the choice. In the conditional logit approach, first introduced by 
McFadden (1973), the expected utilities are modeled as a function of the characteristics of the 
alternatives rather than attributes of the individuals. This model, like most logistic choice 
models, assumes that the error term follows an extreme value distribution and is independent 
across alternatives. In the present context, a principal is choosing among J candidates for a 
position, with candidates varying in the levels of a set of characteristics they possess. I use 
observations at the application level to construct each principal’s choice sets, allowing the set of 
options to vary between each school and subject. As this specification only allows for one 
positive outcome. The choice set is all individuals applying to the position before the first 
request. Conditional logit takes the following form: 







′ 𝛽) + ∑ exp (𝑥𝑖′𝑗
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                                          (4) 
Where i is the set of applicants, and j is the set of open positions.  
In addition, I estimate an alternative-specific conditional logistic regression to account for 
variation in the applicant pools for different positions while also controlling for interactions with 
characteristics of the principals making the hiring request decision. Traditional conditional logit 
assumes the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, that is, the odds of choosing 
alternative j over alternative k should be independent of the choice set for all pairs j,k. The 
classic example of a situation where this assumption does not hold is commuters choosing 
between three transportation alternatives, a train, a red bus and a blue bus. If consumers do not 
care about bus color, the choice between a train and a red bus will vary with the availability of 
blue buses, violating the assumption, which is resolved by using the alternative-specific 
conditional estimation model, which takes the following form:  
Pr(𝑌𝑗|𝑌𝑗𝜖{𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑡}, 𝜆𝑖) =
exp (𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝜆𝑖)
exp(𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝜆𝑖) + ∑ exp (𝑥𝑖′𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝜆𝑖)
 
𝑖′𝜖𝐼^𝑗
                  (5) 
Where all main difference is now that principal-subject specific variables (𝜆𝑖) are allowed to 
affect the choices over alternatives.  
1.5 Findings 
1.5.1 Evidence of Poor Decision Making 
The main results evaluating the principals’ choices in the context of later teacher 
performance use the sample of all applicants who applied to at least one core academic position: 
Elementary general education, Math, Science, English, or Social Science. Table 1.4 reports the 
marginal effects of the of candidate characteristics on the probability of being selected for a 
hiring request and (for those that are hired) on various teacher performance measures. Table 1.5 
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presents the estimates for the sub-sample of candidates who could not be identified as having 
previously worked in the district and are denoted as “New.” This second sample is meaningful as 
the application requirements differed between new and internal hires (internal hires can only be 
hired during April and are not required to complete the screening tools), and principals may 
evaluate internal hires differently. In addition, in Table A1.1 it can be seen for the full sample 
that the following results would not change much if the hired outcomes was used instead of the 
hiring request outcome. 
The estimates show that in both the full and new-applicant samples, teaching 
certification, student teaching in the district, employee referral, advanced degrees and education 
majors are associated with a greater likelihood of being selected for a hiring offer. Advanced 
degrees are positively related with state evaluation and negatively related with attendance for the 
full sample only, as well as negatively related with both retention measures for both samples. 
Student teaching in the district is positively related with attendance for both samples. The 
marginal effect of teaching experience is negative for state evaluation scores and retention in the 
school for the full sample. Certifications were rarely related to positive performance outcomes in 
the two analysis samples. College GPA is positively related with the state teacher observation 
measure and one retention measure in both analysis samples. Referrals are negatively correlated 
with attendance in the new-teacher sample and are not significantly related to any other teacher 
performance measure. Possessing an Education degree is not significantly correlated with any 
performance measure.  
Despite using different application information than what is employed in prior studies, 
the results are consistent with the findings on college GPA in Jacob et al. (2018) and Bruno and 
Strunk, 2019. However, possibly due to a noisy measure of teacher experience and different 
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measures of being a local applicant, my results differ from those of Jacob et al. on those 
characteristics of candidates.  
If one were to rely on district wide comparisons, the policy implications (if teacher 
quality is the only factor in the hiring decision) are those where the direction of the predictors of 
the principal hiring decision and teacher quality do not match. The most important mismatches 
are those where candidate characteristics associated with improved classroom performance or 
persistence are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with principal hiring decisions. My 
estimates yield two such mismatches, college GPA and submitting an application close to the 
posting date. College GPA is positively correlated with official evaluation scores and the 
persistence of a teacher in their initial placement school, with no discernable effect on the 
principal hiring decision. Submitting an application soon after a job is posted has a small, 
positive effect on hiring decisions, but is negatively correlated with official evaluation scores and 
persistence in the initial school and district. 
However, as the sample sizes of hired candidates are relatively small, the estimated 
models exhibit only modest explanatory power. As such, the mismatches between indicators of 
teacher quality and hiring decisions are based on the comparison of two relatively imprecise 
relationships. However, the relationships being noisy is in line with prior research, which has 
long found that identifying superior teachers from observable characteristics is difficult. 
1.5.2 Evidence of Making the Best of Bad Situations 
Beyond statistical issues, there are more fundamental reasons to caution against drawing 
firm conclusions from the previous principal decision analysis. Like other recent quantitative 
studies of the principal hiring decisions, the analysis implicitly assumes that, in an optimal 
situation, principals should select the best teacher candidate among all applicants to the district. 
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Thus, the observable characteristics associated with selection for a hiring request differing from 
those associated with superior teacher performance implies that principals are making poor 
choices. Therefore, a policy altering principal decisions would improve hiring outcomes. 
However, this inference that the disparities stem entirely from the principals’ decisions 
might be incorrect for several reasons. One reason is that principals could obtain valuable 
information about candidates from sources other than the application, either through professional 
networks or during the interview process, and then use this private information to make their 
decisions. In this case, it may appear that principals are ignoring information which predicts 
teacher performance, when they are instead relying on other candidate-specific information that 
may better predict later teaching performance. However, since there is no recorded information 
about what information is obtained in interviews, I cannot examine principal usage of private 
information.  
Second, the pool of candidates for a given position may differ from the total set of 
applicants for the district. For example, many studies have shown that given the fixed salary 
schedules for teachers, schools with low-performing, disruptive, or disadvantaged students have 
greater difficulty in attracting and retaining teachers (e.g. Sass et al., 2012; Levin & Quinn, 2003; 
Liu et al., 2008; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; Boyd et al., 2011; Lankford et al., 2002; Imazeki, 
2005; Scafidi et al. 2007). Therefore, what appears to be a sub-optimal selection in the aggregate 
estimation, may be the best choice among the candidates willing to work at the school.  
To provide context, Tables 1.6 provides descriptive evidence on variation in the size and 
quality of the applicant pool across schools and subjects. The statistics reported in Table 1.6 
show that smaller schools receive more applications per position and greater portions of those 
applicants have relatively high GPAs. English and Social sciences have the greatest number of 
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applicants of the 6-12 subjects, but math has the highest portion of high-GPA candidates. 
Elementary has a much higher number of applicants, but this is most likely an artifact of how 
every elementary hire at a school has to be aggregated into one “position” based on how the data 
set was constructed at the subject-school-year level and there are no consistent subject 
designations for elementary positions.  Interestingly, however, even with these larger-pool 
elementary positions had a higher mean portion of candidates with high GPAs and a lower 
standard deviation. There is little relation between the portion of students who are economically 
disadvantaged at a school and the number of applicants, but a greater share of the applicants to 
low poverty schools had higher GPAs. Without adjusting for the school level or subject area, 
schools that received a grade of A have more applicants than F schools, but there is no clear 
overall relation between school grade and number of applicants.  
Table 1.7 presents estimates of the coefficients from multivariate regressions predicting 
candidate pool size and quality. In this way, both the school level and subject area, as well as 
characteristics of interest can be controlled for simultaneously. In this estimation, there are no 
systematic differences in pool size or pool quality (as measured by the portion of candidates with 
a high GPA) across school grades or student body characteristics. The sample size for this 
regression may seem small in comparison to the number of hires, but this is due to the sample 
being at most four positions per year per middle and high school, and one per elementary school, 
as well as all hires for a non-core positions being removed from the sample. For the applicant 
pool size, there is no significant relationship outside of the other subjects and school levels 
having fewer applicants than elementary school positions, but this is probably due to the way the 
data set was constructed as discussed earlier. 
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Table 1.8 presents the estimated relationship between the GPA of the selected candidates 
and the pool of candidates for the position while controlling for other aspects of the position. 
With controls, the average GPA of the first selected candidate is unrelated to pool size, but does 
increase with the proportion of the pool with high GPAs, though this relation may be purely 
mechanical. With a greater proportion of high-GPA candidates in the pool, it is more likely that a 
high-GPA candidate is selected, even if principals are choosing randomly.  However, these 
results are consistent with the notion that the apparent principal selection misalignment could 
partially stem from differences in the applicant pool. The results are very similar when all 
principal selections (not just the first choice) are included in the estimation; these results are in 
appendix Table A1.1. The relationship between the GPA of the selected candidate and pool 
characteristics is illustrated in the scatter plots in presented in Figures A1.1 and A1.2 in the 
appendix. These plots show that among similar applicants pools there is dramatic variation in 
selected the candidates’ GPA, which does not support the hypothesis that the mismatches in 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 are driven by applicant pool differences. 
Using the conditional logistic regression model as a method to statistically control for the 
applicant pool when estimating principal choices, the discrepancies between the significant 
determinants of hiring offers and teacher productivity largely vanish, though this could likely be 
an artifact of decreased sample size and increased standard errors. In most instances the point 
estimates are roughly comparable across models, but the standard errors are generally 
considerably higher for the estimates from the conditional logit model, which reduces statistical 
significance.  With the reduction in statistical significance there are no longer statistically 
significant mismatches between influence on hiring offers and teacher productivity for how the 
candidate learned about the job, having an advanced degree, being teaching certified, and the 
       
30 
 
application timing. However, allowing for the differences in candidate pools using the 
conditional logistic model does not alter the basic finding that candidate GPA is unrelated to the 
probability of a request to hire. The comparisons of conditional logistic results and probit results 
are reported in Tables 1.9 (for all applicants) and 1.10 (for new hires only).  
The estimates from the alternative specific conditional logit, which are presented in Table 
1.11, are rather noisy, and as there is no consistent relation between principal characteristics and 
choices; the results do not support the hypothesis that the principal’s experience or evaluation 
scores are related to the quality of candidate they selected. The few significant relationships may 
suggest that principals with higher evaluation scores are less likely to choose worse candidates 
when controlling for their applicant pool. Specifically, principals with experience are less likely 
to pick candidates with top attributes who are inexperienced, are also more likely to pick a 
teacher with all other top candidate characteristics that applied later, and less likely to choose a 
candidate without any top candidate characteristics. Higher rated pricnipals are more willing to 
select a top GPA candidate with no other top characteristics, and less likely to select a candidate 
with only experience. 
A third possible reason for the apparent misalignment between candidate selection and 
candidate quality is that principals may recognize that they compete with other schools for 
candidates, and strategically choose potentially lower-quality candidates who have a higher 
probability of acceptance. (Murphy, 1986; Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 2003; Abdulkadiroğlu et 
al., 2005; Ergin & Sönmez, 2006; Chen & Sönmez, 2006). Partial evidence of this can be seen in 
Table A1.2 where the candidates requested later by the school have slightly lower college GPAs. 
During the time between an offer being made and its rejection by a candidate, the quantity and 
most likely the quality of remaining candidates may decline as they accept other offers (Ryan et 
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al., 2000, Bruno & Strunk, 2019). In the district I study, the time frame for a request to be settled, 
whether accepted or rejected, varied between four days and two months in the peak hiring 
season.  Unfortunately, at this time I cannot offer evidence to test the possibility that strategic 
decision making is occurring.  
1.6 Policy Discussion and Next Steps 
The extant literature provides evidence which suggests that by manipulating principal 
decisions, either through training principals or directly screening candidates at the district level, 
the quality of newly hired teachers can be improved (Jacob et al., 2018; Bruno & Strunk, 2019). 
To implement a screening policy based on a characteristic, the characteristic must be something 
that cannot be easily manipulated by the candidates. When relying on the district-wide estimates, 
college GPA is the most reliable prospect for a screener as it appears to be under-utilized and is 
not malleable by candidates. These properties suggest that the district could improve the 
classroom performance of recently hired teachers by establishing minimum GPA requirements or 
incentivizing principals to more strongly consider candidates with higher GPAs.  
However, for this type of policy to improve hiring outcomes, principals must currently be 
making sub-optimal choices in their selection of candidates to receive job offers. Due to the 
success of the screening system studied in Bruno and Strunk (2019), principal decision 
misalignment with teacher performance is likely to be part of the reason for potentially sub-
optimal candidate selections. The current paper, however, provides preliminary evidence that 
principal decisions may be more complicated than choosing the best unemployed teacher in the 
area.  What appear to be poor decisions by principals may in fact be optimal, given they may 
face different applicant pools while competing with other principals to hire quality candidates.  
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These additional influences on the principals’ choices have contrasting policy 
implications. If competition is a contributing factor, districts may want to use programs to 
promote their schools’ appeal to candidates, such as bonus programs or other non-pecuniary 
benefits. However, if differences in applicant pools lead to misalignment between hiring and 
teacher quality predictors, then implementing screeners can actually exacerbate the hiring 
difficulties that high-needs schools face as the number of teachers in their pool is already limited 
and they may not be able to hire a candidate meeting the screening criteria. To correct for 
variation in principal selections due to differences in the pools of applicants, a district would 
need to take steps to alter the distribution of candidates. There are a variety of ways in which this 
might be accomplished, including providing information about school quality to candidates, 
restricting the number of candidates that can apply to more desirable positions, requiring 
candidates apply to multiple schools (with perhaps a preference ordering) and offering monetary 
inducements to work in “high-need” schools. Districts could also engage in active recruitment to 
bolster the pool quality and size for positions with inadequate applicant pools.  
However, from the current analysis, altering the candidate pools is unlikely to close the 
teacher quality gaps in hiring as there are no readily observable systematic differences in the size 
and quality of the applicant pools. In addition, no readily observable principal characteristics are 
associated with “better” hires, so any targeted professional learning or interventions regarding 
talent recruitment and hiring need to be assigned based on hiring outcomes and not observable 
principal characteristics. Due to this finding, it is likely that the disconnect between the relation 
of GPA to hiring requests and GPA to teacher quality is not fully attributable to applicant pool 
differences, and is in some part principal error which may be possible to correct with more 
information or incentives to select candidates with more desirable observable characteristics. 
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Due to the finding that a pool with a greater portion of high GPA candidates is related with a 
selection of candidates with a higher GPA, it may be tempting to return to the notion of 
screening on GPA. If the goal is to hire candidates with higher GPAs this is a good strategy, but 
the use of GPA as a single measure of candidate quality can be problematic if other unobserved 
factors are significant determinants of teacher quality.  
  




Table 1.1 Candidate and Hires Characteristics 
 New to the District All Candidates All Hires 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Certified in Georgia*  0.680 0.466 0.733 0.442 0.855 0.352 
Certified Outside of Georgia* 0.216 0.411 0.160 0.366 0.082 0.274 
Did Not Report Certification 
Status 
0.414 0.493 0.368 0.482 0.132 0.339 
National Board Certified* 0.075 0.263 0.072 0.259 0.059 0.239 
Did Not Report National Board 
Status 
0.294 0.455 0.393 0.488 0.970 0.171 
Student Taught in District* 0.146 0.353 0.183 0.387 0.317 0.466 
Did Not Report Student 
Teaching 
0.704 0.456 0.730 0.444 0.704 0.457 
Some Teaching  Experience* 0.345 0.475 0.356 0.479 0.364 0.481 
More than Five Years Teaching 
Experience 
0.174 0.379 0.244 0.430 0.404 0.491 
Previously Worked in District* N/A N/A 0.259 0.438 0.490 0.500 
Did Not Report Work History 0.026 0.160 0.024 0.154 0.022 0.147 
Currently Under Contract* 0.185 0.388 0.195 0.396 0.308 0.468 
Did Not Answer Previous 
Employment Questions 
0.174 0.379 0.294 0.456 0.965 0.183 
Found the Job through District 
Employee* 
0.095 0.293 0.107 0.309 0.175 0.380 
Did Not Report How Found Job 0.020 0.140 0.072 0.258 0.120 0.325 
Advanced Degree* 0.524 0.499 0.565 0.496 0.683 0.465 
Education Major* 0.535 0.499 0.572 0.495 0.706 0.456 
Did Not Report Education 0.029 0.168 0.028 0.166 0.004 0.059 
College GPA* 3.150 0.428 3.141 0.429 3.175 0.425 
Did Not Report Any College 
GPA 
0.314 0.464 0.310 0.463 0.197 0.398 
Applied Before April 0.390 0.488 0.406 0.491 0.388 0.488 
Average Application Date 
Percentile 
46.517 27.667 45.628 27.578 49.153 24.713 
Average Application Date 
Percentile Missing 
0.091 0.287 0.093 0.291 0.066 0.249 
Number of Positions Applied to 6.630 9.707 7.059 10.574 11.029 14.408 
Applied to a Non-Standard 
Positions 
0.318 0.466 0.345 0.475 0.370 0.483 
GALLUP Score* 74.587 10.114 74.566 10.270 75.816 9.559 
No GALLUP Score 0.672 0.469 0.699 0.459 0.543 0.498 
Female* 0.789 0.408 0.786 0.410 0.779 0.415 
Did Not Report Gender 0.062 0.241 0.114 0.317 0.148 0.355 
Race Black* 0.759 0.428 0.785 0.411 0.772 0.419 
Race Non-White Other* 0.026 0.160 0.025 0.157 0.024 0.152 
Did Not Report Race 0.089 0.285 0.139 0.346 0.170 0.376 
Number of Applicants or 
Hires± 
11,048 14,884 1,128 
Notes: *All summary statistics for these fields is reported with the missing values suppressed. The values seen are 
the summary statistics for the applicants who answered those fields. In some cases the number of candidates who 
answered a question can be quite small. ±One observation per person per year.  
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Table 1.2 School and Principal Characteristics of the Schools who Hired Applicants 
 All Hires 
VARIABLES Mean St. Dev 
Middle School 0.172 0.378 
High School 0.212 0.409 
Other School Level 0.017 0.129 
School Accountability (CCRPI) Score 47.430 31.965 
School Accountability Score Missing 0.281 0.450 
School Climate (STAR) Score 2.059 1.528 
School Climate Score Missing 0.288 0.453 
Received a School Grade of C or Higher 0.477 0.500 
No GADOE School Grade 0.252 0.434 
Number of Students in the School (100s) 6.003 4.803 
Portion of Students Directly Certified 45.635 34.004 
Portion of the Students Female 0.364 0.218 
Portion of Students Hispanic 0.054 0.080 
Portion of Students Black 0.615 0.421 
Student Characteristics Missing 0.246 0.431 
Principal’s Experience in the District 2.987 3.264 
Principal’s Evaluation Score 12.270 7.402 
No Principal’s Evaluation Score 0.259 0.438 
Principal and Hire are Black 0.410 0.492 
Principal and Hire are Female 0.267 0.443 
No Principal Characteristics 0.253 0.435 
Number of Applicants Hired to the District± 1,128 
Notes: ±One observation per person per year. 
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables 
 All New 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 








19.898 2.616 743 19.787 2.526 385 
Mean Student 
Growth Percentile 
47.650 8.728 245 48.648 8.632 129 
Persistence in 
Initial School  
0.635 0.482 803 0.671 0.471 422 
Persistence in 
District 
0.690 0.463 922 0.721 0.449 462 
Teacher 
Attendance 
0.961 0.036 884 0.966 0.028 455 
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Table 1.4 Estimates of the Determinants of Hiring Requests, Teacher Productivity, Teacher 
Persistence and Teacher Attendance (All Applicants) 
 Applicants Applicants Who Are Hired 















Certified in Georgia 0.035*** -0.150 2.496 0.026 0.093 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.538) (2.231) (0.076) (0.063) (0.005) 
Certified Outside of 
Georgia 
0.026** 0.022 6.005** -0.009 0.065 0.004 
(0.011) (0.616) (2.787) (0.096) (0.083) (0.006) 
National Board Certified -0.009 2.710***    -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.968)    (0.008) 
Student Taught in 
District 
0.034*** -0.163 -0.339 -0.011 0.074 0.009** 
(0.009) (0.387) (2.314) (0.062) (0.060) (0.004) 
Previously Worked in 
District 
0.002 0.186 -0.467 -0.052 -0.027 -0.005** 
(0.005) (0.205) (1.361) (0.036) (0.034) (0.002) 
Some Teaching 
Experience  
0.001 -0.315* -1.550 -0.078** -0.010 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.189) (1.329) (0.033) (0.031) (0.002) 
Currently Under 
Contract 
0.008 0.459 -10.286** -0.110 -0.090 -0.012 
(0.009) (1.488) (4.816) (0.190) (0.172) (0.012) 
Found the Job through 
District Employee 
0.023*** -0.099 -1.005 0.042 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.249) (1.562) (0.046) (0.043) (0.003) 
Advanced Degree 0.016*** 0.390* 2.498** -0.121*** -0.081** -0.005* 
 (0.005) (0.201) (1.220) (0.038) (0.036) (0.003) 
Education Major 0.011** -0.036 -0.670 -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.219) (1.554) (0.041) (0.038) (0.003) 
College GPA -0.003 0.837*** 1.517 0.080* 0.052 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.250) (1.662) (0.045) (0.042) (0.003) 
Average Application 
Date Percentile 
0.000*** -0.015*** -0.035 -0.002*** -0.001* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
GALLUP Score 0.001* 0.010 0.094 0.002 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.058) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X 
Number and Type of 
Applications 
X X X X X X 
Candidate Gender and 
Race 
X X X X X X 
Principal and School 
Characteristics 
 X X X X X 
Constant  14.778*** 36.009**    
  (2.659) (14.614)    
Observations 14,884 743 245 790 920 884 
R-squared  0.250 0.310    
Notes: One observation per person per year. For all variables in the model, if the value was missing the variable 
value was set to zero, and for each variable there is a matching variable equal to 1 if the original variable was 
missing. Only regressions with linear specifications have marginal effects for the constant term.
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Table 1.5 Estimates of the Determinants of Hiring Requests, Teacher Productivity, Teacher 
Persistence and Teacher Attendance (New Applicants) 


















Certified in Georgia 0.030*** 0.035 -1.887 0.209* 0.115 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.860) (2.746) (0.121) (0.097) (0.006) 
Certified Outside of 
Georgia 
0.030*** 0.453 2.564 0.120 0.061 -0.005 
(0.011) (0.908) (3.372) (0.133) (0.112) (0.007) 
National Board 
Certified 
-0.012 0.047    -0.009 
(0.014) (0.997)    (0.021) 
Student Taught in 
District 
0.024*** -0.374 1.269 -0.047 0.052 0.013** 
(0.009) (0.518) (3.247) (0.079) (0.076) (0.005) 
Some Teaching 
Experience 
-0.004 -0.072 -2.680 -0.073 -0.023 0.001 
(0.004) (0.271) (1.884) (0.047) (0.044) (0.003) 
Currently Under 
Contract 
0.012* 1.664  0.081 -0.053 -0.019 
(0.007) (1.229)  (0.411) (0.364) (0.022) 
Found Job through 
District Employee 
0.023*** -0.140 -1.018 0.072 -0.027 -0.006* 
(0.005) (0.321) (2.005) (0.058) (0.051) (0.003) 
Advanced Degree 0.014*** 0.391 1.768 -0.170*** -0.095** -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.257) (1.625) (0.050) (0.045) (0.003) 
Education Major 0.008* -0.083 2.539 0.070 0.048 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.339) (2.228) (0.053) (0.050) (0.003) 
College GPA -0.003 0.790*** 2.074 0.095 0.115** 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.293) (2.493) (0.061) (0.054) (0.003) 
Average Application 
Date Percentile 
0.000*** -0.014*** -0.094** -0.001 -0.001 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.040) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
GALLUP Score 0.000 0.019 0.193*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.066) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Number and Type of 
Applications 
X X X X X X 
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X 
Candidate Gender 
and Race 
X X X X X X 
Principal 
Characteristics 
 X X X X X 
School 
Characteristics 
 X X X X  
Constant  14.295*** -0.602    
  (3.525) (21.585)    
Observations 11,048 385 129 413 460 455 
R-squared  0.336 0.461    
Notes: One observation per person per year. For all variables in the model, if the value was missing the variable 
value was set to zero, and for each variable there is a matching variable equal to 1 if the original variable was 
missing. Only regressions with linear specifications have marginal effects for the constant term. 
  
       
39 
 
Table 1.6 Number and Quality of Applicants by School Characteristics and by Subject Area 
 Number of Applicants 
% of Candidates 
in the top Quintile 
of Applicant GPA 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
To All Schools 198.745 233.352  20.000 0.000 
By Core Subjects 
Elementary 369.915 290.250  17.500 5.869 
English 120.107 118.740  16.481 17.081 
Social Science 134.277 138.101  12.135 5.253 
Math  81.968 82.780  14.022 6.613 
Science 76.516 72.955  12.050 5.204 
By Number of Students in the School 
Less Than 500 207.456 299.004 15.403 10.821 
Between 500 and 750 247.594 212.542 16.712 10.633 
Between 750 and 1000 159.227 177.190 14.056 7.069 
Greater than 1000 97.364 88.138 14.151 6.313 
Missing 404.68 339.418 13.326 4.782 
By School Level 
Elementary 371.287 290.958 17.551 5.862 
Middle School 89.354 84.907 13.529 13.475 
High School 112.281 122.761 13.921 5.914 
Other School Level 81.091 31.536 12.457 3.419 
By Percent of Students Directly Certified 
Less than 25 188.259 167.642 17.154 6.540 
25 to 50 288.091 249.547 15.569 7.022 
50 to 75 143.447 213.728 14.174 8.894 
Greater than 75 228.630 227.833 15.638 10.501 
Missing 404.68 339.418 13.326 4.782 
By School Grade 
A  248.826 191.091 17.482 6.204 
B 136.042 164.886 15.135 6.424 
C 169.870 184.655 15.954 6.414 
D 169.460 176.359 15.619 10.809 
F 187.681 249.583 14.153 9.240 
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Table 1.7 Estimates of the Determinants of the Candidate Pool Size and Quality 
VARIABLES Total Size of 
the Pool 
Total Size of 
the Pool Before 












Middle School -220.579*** -205.755*** -0.043 -0.036 
 (77.127) (61.715) (0.037) (0.045) 
High School -247.748* -228.932* -0.024 -0.055 
 (134.627) (130.100) (0.064) (0.093) 
Other School Level 2.094 7.402 -0.066 -0.059 
 (103.241) (99.716) (0.049) (0.071) 
Portion of Students 
Directly Certified 
-1.075 -2.065 -0.000 -0.000 
(1.677) (1.610) (0.001) (0.001) 
GADOE School Climate 
STAR Score 
3.925 6.754 -0.003 -0.006 
(12.868) (12.413) (0.006) (0.009) 
Number of Students 
(100s) 
0.517 0.650 -0.002 -0.001 
(3.717) (3.578) (0.002) (0.003) 
Portion of Students 
Hispanic 
-294.847 -167.649 -0.045 -0.053 
(211.934) (203.296) (0.101) (0.145) 
Portion of Students 
Black 
-53.222 43.561 -0.081 -0.071 
 (172.874) (165.517) (0.082) (0.118) 
GADOE School Grade 
A 
-86.965 -69.931 -0.019 -0.023 
 (62.450) (59.119) (0.030) (0.042) 
GADOE School Grade 
B 
-65.623 -47.214 -0.015 -0.060* 
 (48.039) (46.024) (0.023) (0.033) 
GADOE School Grade 
D 
-13.973 6.747 0.010 0.004 
 (37.669) (36.397) (0.018) (0.026) 
GADOE School Grade F 27.974 65.736* 0.000 -0.007 
(39.052) (37.685) (0.019) (0.027) 
Science -256.321*** -246.111*** 0.026 -0.025 
 (95.278) (91.940) (0.046) (0.066) 
Math -225.686** -219.509** 0.011 0.014 
 (102.652) (99.212) (0.049) (0.071) 
Social Science -279.119* -263.123* -0.002 -0.043 
 (144.253) (139.351) (0.069) (0.100) 
English -283.504** -262.394** 0.014 -0.012 
 (117.420) (113.462) (0.056) (0.081) 
Middle School Science 200.917* 194.489* -0.025 -0.039 
 (118.764) (107.382) (0.057) (0.077) 
High School Science 178.540 176.938 -0.045 0.001 
 (160.893) (155.411) (0.077) (0.111) 
Middle School Math 152.635 158.525 -0.028 -0.027 
 (125.104) (114.235) (0.060) (0.082) 
High School Math 167.196 164.793 0.007 0.007 
 (164.416) (158.917) (0.078) (0.113) 
Middle School English 240.104* 226.613* 0.044 0.009 
 (141.762) (129.858) (0.068) (0.093) 
High School English 253.939 235.969 -0.008 0.006 
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 (176.652) (170.713) (0.084) (0.122) 
Middle School Social 
Science 
234.702 221.917 -0.008 -0.028 
(160.221) (149.781) (0.076) (0.107) 
High School Social 
Science 
287.744 274.808 -0.019 0.020 
(192.442) (185.949) (0.092) (0.133) 
Number of Applicants 
for Pool 
  -0.003 -0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 478.299*** 384.704*** 0.287*** 0.320*** 
 (122.235) (117.173) (0.059) (0.085) 
Observations 357 361 357 361 
R-squared 0.446 0.408 0.122 0.110 
Notes: Subjects omitted Elementary which was denoted as its own subject. School levels also omitted elementary. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 1.8 Estimates of the Determinants of the Grade Point Average of the Applicants who were 













Pool Characteristics     
Number of Applicants to 
School-Subject Before 
the First Request (100s) 
0.040*** 0.013 0.020 0.016 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Percent of Candidates 
before the First Request 
with a GPA in the top 
Quintile 
0.866*** 0.659*** 0.668*** 0.641*** 
(0.137) (0.144) (0.153) (0.157) 
School Characteristics     
Middle School  -0.117 -0.054 -0.097 
  (0.091) (0.093) (0.267) 
High School  -0.111 -0.037 0.449*** 
  (0.095) (0.099) (0.125) 
Other School Level  -0.276** -0.255** 0.127 
  (0.111) (0.117) (0.284) 
Portion of Students 
Directly Certified 
 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
GADOE School Climate 
STAR Score 
 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) 
GADOE School CCRPI 
Score 
 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of Students 
(100s) 
 -0.013 -0.015* -0.010 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Portion of Students 
Hispanic 
 -0.371 -0.314 -0.287 
 (0.409) (0.412) (0.413) 
Portion of Students 
Black 
 -0.122 -0.138 -0.130 
  (0.334) (0.361) (0.363) 
Principal 
Characteristics 
    
Principal Years of 
Experience 
  -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Principals LKES Score   0.021 0.019 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Subject Controls     
Science    -0.550 
    (0.338) 
Math    -0.380 
    (0.256) 
Social Science    -0.169 
    (0.331) 
English    -0.541 
    (0.334) 
Middle School Science    0.489 
    (0.421) 
High School Science    0.019 
    (0.346) 
Middle School Math    0.418 
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    (0.352) 
High School Math    -0.103 
    (0.254) 
Middle School English    0.591 
    (0.425) 
High School English    0.094 
    (0.368) 
Middle School Social 
Science 
   0.255 
   (0.396) 
High School Social 
Science 
   -0.328 
    (0.336) 
Constant 2.939*** 3.678*** 3.292*** 3.237*** 
 (0.040) (0.289) (0.364) (0.373) 
Observations 293 293 293 293 
R-squared 0.108 0.171 0.191 0.207 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Subjects omitted Elementary which was 
denoted as its own subject. School levels also omitted elementary. Outcome is the Candidate’s GPA. The sample is 
all candidates who were selected first in a school-subject pool.  
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Table 1.9 Estimates of the Determinants of the Likelihood of Being Selected for a Hiring 
Request – All Applicants and Positions Combined Versus Separate Pools for Each Position 
Hiring Requests-All Applicants 
 Probit Probit Conditional Logit 
 Full Candidate 
Pool* 
Candidates in the 
Clogit Pool±  
Different 
Applicant Pools° 
Certified in Georgia 0.035*** 0.039** 0.065  
(0.009) (0.017) (0.131) 
Certified Outside of 
Georgia 
0.026** 0.026 0.039 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.440) 
National Board 
Certified 
-0.009 0.006 -0.115 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.258) 
Student Taught in 
District 
0.034*** 0.043*** 0.106** 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
Previously Worked 
in District 
0.002 -0.002 -0.008 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.722) 
Some Teaching 
Experience 
0.001 0.057 0.018 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.351) 
Currently Under 
Contract 
0.008 0.083 0.099*** 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.002) 
Found the Job 
through District 
Employee 
0.023*** 0.013 0.045 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.105) 
Advanced Degree 0.016*** 0.014* 0.001  
(0.005) (0.007) (0.963) 
Education Major 0.011** 0.005 0.537**  
(0.005) (0.008) (0.030) 
College GPA -0.003 -0.028 0.215  




0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.687) 
GALLUP Score 0.001* 0.001 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.976) 
N 14,884 7,528 19,215 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first two columns have one observation 
per person per year. The third column is one observation per applicant per school-subject-year. 
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Table 1.10 Estimates of the Determinants of the Likelihood of Being Selected for a Hiring 
Request – All Applicants and Positions Combined Versus Separate Pools for Each Position (New 
Applicants) 
Hiring Requests-New Applicants 
 Probit Probit Conditional Logit 
 Full Candidate Pool* 
Candidates in 





0.030*** 0.035** 0.047 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.065) 
Certified Outside 
of Georgia 
0.030*** 0.030** 0.084 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.079) 
National Board 
Certified 
-0.012 -0.004 -0.127 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.116) 
Student Taught in 
District 
0.024*** 0.018 0.114** 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.061) 
Some Teaching 
Experience 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.024) 
Currently Under 
Contract 
0.012* 0.106 0.109** 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.043) 
Found the Job 
through District 
Employee 
0.023*** 0.013* 0.050 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.034) 
Advanced Degree 0.014*** 0.014** -0.004  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.840) 
Education Major 0.008* 0.008 0.518  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.037) 
College GPA -0.003 -0.006 -0.007  




0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GALLUP Score 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
N 11,048 5,396 8,373 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first two columns have one observation 
per person per year. The third column is one observation per applicant per school-subject-year. 
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1.8 Appendix 1 
Table A1.1 Principal Decision Using Hired instead of Hiring Request 
 All New 
VARIABLES Hired Hired 
   
Certified in Georgia 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Certified Outside of Georgia 0.016 0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
National Board Certified -0.050 -0.035 
 (0.033) (0.038) 
Student Taught in District 0.034*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Previously Worked in District -0.002 N/A 
 (0.005)  
Some Teaching Experience -0.002 -0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Currently Under Contract -0.012 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.012) 




Advanced Degree 0.013*** 0.007** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Education Major 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
College GPA -0.003 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) 




GALLUP Score 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 14,884 11,048 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A1.2 Estimates of the Determinants of the Grade Point Average of the Applicants who 
were selected by Principals for all their Requests 
VARIABLES Pool 
Characteristics 
Pool and School 
Characteristics 







Pool Characteristics     
Number of Applicants to 
School-Subject (100s) 
0.017*** 0.013** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Percent of All 
Candidates with a GPA 
in the top Quintile 
1.381*** 0.697*** 0.662*** 0.689*** 
(0.297) (0.218) (0.223) (0.222) 
School Characteristics     
Middle School  -0.107** -0.088* 0.051 
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.146) 
High School  -0.092** -0.055 0.621*** 
  (0.046) (0.051) (0.082) 
Other School Level  0.170 0.177 0.189 
  (0.123) (0.132) (0.228) 
Portion of Students 
Directly Certified 
 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GADOE School Climate 
STAR Score 
 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
GADOE School CCRPI 
Score 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of Students 
(100s) 
 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Portion of Students 
Hispanic 
 -0.400* -0.369* -0.371* 
 (0.204) (0.207) (0.207) 
Portion of Students 
Black 
 -0.364* -0.401* -0.388* 
  (0.190) (0.205) (0.207) 
Principal 
Characteristics 
    
Principal Years of 
Experience 
  -0.003** -0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Principals LKES Score   0.018** 0.017** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Subject Controls     
Science    0.006 
    (0.197) 
Math    0.011 
    (0.282) 
Social Science    -0.259 
    (0.249) 
English    0.039 
    (0.296) 
Middle School Science    -0.099 
    (0.242) 
High School Science    -0.699*** 
    (0.203) 
Middle School Math    -0.101 
    (0.319) 
High School Math    -0.738*** 
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    (0.281) 
Middle School English    -0.208 
    (0.332) 
High School English    -0.701** 
    (0.304) 
Middle School Social 
Science 
   0.032 
    (0.284) 
High School Social 
Science 
   -0.398 
    (0.254) 
Request Order -0.003 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 2.906*** 3.204*** 2.947*** 2.887*** 
 (0.049) (0.194) (0.202) (0.206) 
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 
R-squared 0.045 0.087 0.097 0.105 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Outcome is the Candidate’s GPA. The 
sample is all candidates who were selected with a control for selection order.  
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Fraction of Candidates in the Top Quintile of GPA before the First Request Number of Applicants to School-Subject before the first request (100s) 
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Fraction of All Candidates in the Top Quintile of GPA Number of Applicants to School-Subject 
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Table A1.3 Alternative Specific Conditional Logistic Regression Selection Probabilities 




























First 20% of 
Applicants 
Certified 
    0.037 2.305 1.770 0.044 0.016 
    0.045 4.130 4.297 0.033 0.091 
    0.044 3.071 3.693 0.042 0.038 
    0.104 6.646 8.678 0.107 0.049 
    0.141 13.665 13.925 0.145 0.120 
    0.119 7.421 8.419 0.132 0.090 
    0.243 10.608 14.226 0.321 0.129 
    0.205 21.022 27.025 0.222 0.107 
    0.000 1.290 0.643 0.000 0.000 
    0.017 2.058 1.835 0.009 0.095 
    0.048 1.452 1.035 0.098 0.058 
    0.026 3.041 4.105 0.036 0.013 
    0.045 7.528 22.512 0.045 0.132 
    0.020 2.444 3.759 0.007 0.084 
    0.055 3.697 9.208 0.077 0.074 
    0.061 13.579 51.565 0.054 0.068 
Notes: Category had this Characteristic.
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2 Where They Stop Nobody Knows: What Drives Teacher Placement 
Decisions? 
2. 1. Introduction 
To understand the labor market, how workers and firms come together to produce 
goods and services, it is vital to understand how workers enter a given firm. To 
understand this, there are two sides, the firms’ hiring decisions and the workers’ 
employment decisions. The preferences workers have over firms drive their decisions by 
affecting their search efforts and their probability of accepting an offer from a firm. 
Hence, understanding worker preferences is crucial to labor market research.  
Much of the research on worker preferences has focused on the wage differences 
needed to compensate for disparities in non-pecuniary workplace benefits and conditions. 
However, school districts typically utilize fixed salary schedules across schools. These 
schedules do not allow for salary to offset the undesirable aspects of a school. Prior work 
has documented that the combination of teacher preferences and rigid pay schedules can 
lead to disparities in student access to quality teachers. Policymakers are concerned that 
teacher sorting across schools may limit access to high-quality teachers, particularly for 
minority, impoverished, or low-performing students. Teacher sorting may occur in the 
job market for hiring new teachers (Sass et al., 2012; Reininger, 2012) as well as through 
post-hire differential patterns of teacher mobility.13 The disparity in access to quality 
teachers has lasting impacts as teacher quality affects not only their student’s academic 
outcomes, but also their students’ lifetime earnings.14  
                                                 
13 Darling-Hammond 2001; Viadero 2002; Gordon & Maxey 2000; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Feng & Sass 2017 
14 Rivkin et al., 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2008; Chetty et al., 2011, Chetty et al., 2014 
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District policies can possibly mitigate disparities in access to high-quality 
teachers. Some policies that have been tested are bonuses for high-performing teachers to 
remain in or to transfer to low-performing schools, state bonus schemes for teachers in 
high-poverty and low-performing schools, or differential retention programs. Analysis of 
the Talent Transfer Initiative showed that monetary incentives might have to be very 
large to induce highly effective teachers to transfer to low-performing schools. The 
teachers who transferred could improve student scores on math and reading exams in 
elementary schools, but had no impact on math or reading scores for middle school 
students (Glazerman et al., 2013). A North Carolina bonus scheme for math, science, and 
special education teachers working in high-poverty or low-performing schools 
significantly reduced teacher turnover (Clotfelter et al., 2008).  Similarly, a selective 
retention bonus scheme for highly effective teachers in low-performing schools in 
Tennessee led to improved teachers retention in tested grades and subjects (Springer et 
al., 2016) and improved student test-score gains (Springer et al., 2019). Further, targeted 
recruitment strategies may reduce disparities in the supply of new teachers resulting from 
teachers’ geographic preferences (Reininger, 2012; Boyd et al., 2005a).  
The fact that teachers have preferences over the characteristics of their workplace 
means that to address disparities in access to effective teachers, policymakers must know 
how teacher preferences vary and the compensating differentials required to offset those 
preferences. In chapter 1, I found evidence that apparent errors in principal hiring 
decisions that affect the initial distribution of teachers may partially stem from 
differences in the pool of applicants, as well as from sub-optimal use of information by 
principals. Hence, in this chapter, I examine how teachers’ preferences affect their 
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application behavior and thereby affect principals’ hiring choice sets. The results can 
inform schools’ and districts’ decisions regarding teacher recruitment policies or 
adjustments to the application process. For example, the findings can shed light on the 
existing differences in application behavior which can be targeted to improve the 
principals’ hiring choice sets.  
The teacher preference research is extensive and ever-growing, to add to that 
literature in a meaningful way I focus on how candidate preferences affect the choice of 
where to apply. While the majority of the literature uses labor market decisions such as 
transfers and initial placements to determine teacher preferences, few prior studies 
examine the teacher’s decision of where to apply. Those that do consider only particular 
segments of the applicant pool, such as inter-school transfers of existing teachers (Boyd 
et al., 2011), application choices at job fairs (Engel et al., 2014), or recent college 
graduates (Cannata, 2010), or focus on specific aspects such as the role of geography 
(Goff & Bruecker, 2017). Leveraging a partnership with an Atlanta metropolitan area 
school district, the present research will employ rich data that covers both initial and 
transfer applications, which does allow me to compare part of my results to the findings 
of Boyd et al. 2011. I estimate the teacher’s choices to apply to a school by using 
conditional logistic choice models.  
I find that in relation to schools with a Governor’s Office of Student Achievement 
(GOSA) School Report Card letter grade of C, teachers are more likely to apply to a 
school with a grade of F and less likely to apply to schools with a grade of A, B, or D. 
This is an odd result that warrants further investigation in the future but could be due to a 
variety of factors including differences in accountability pressures, variation in resources, 
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and differences in recruitment. I also find that, in accordance with the current preference 
literature, school climate scores are positively correlated with current employee 
application likelihoods, however, the opposite is true for teacher applicants who are new 
to the district. The difference could be due to differences in information availability, 
recruitment efforts, or randomness in applications of new teachers, and warrants further 
investigation. Increases in the proportion of students “directly certified” (a measure of 
poverty) negatively impacts only the application likelihood of current teachers, but there 
is a positive relationship between the number of students and the application likelihoods 
for all teachers. The portion of minority students, Black or Hispanic, in a school is 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of a candidate applying to work in the school, 
Black teaching applicants do have increased application likelihoods to schools with 
greater portions of black students. Of the principal characteristics examined, only the 
principal’s years of experience is positively related to application likelihood for all 
teacher subsamples. The principal’s evaluation score and principal tenure in the school 
either have negative or no relation with the likelihood of an application submission. 
When the interaction of applicant teaching experience with key school characteristics15 
are added to the analysis, they only show a significant relationship for current teachers. 
However, when the applicant’s college GPA is interacted with the same key school 
characteristics as applicant teaching experience as well as the principal characteristics,16 
it only has statistically significant impacts for new teachers. The inclusion of these 
interactions minimally impacts the magnitude of the relations discussed previously.   
                                                 
15 These characteristics are the GOSA Report Card Grade Dummy Variables, the GADOE School Climate Score, the 
number of students, and the percent of students who are Black, Hispanic, or Directly Certified.  
16 These characteristics are the principal’s experience, years in the current school, and their official evaluation score. 
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The next section reviews the employee preference literature for teachers and is 
followed by section 3, which details the hiring processes of the participating district. 
Section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 details the methodology. Section 6 provides 
the results while section 7 summarizes and concludes this essay. 
2.2. Literature Review 
Researchers have long examined the relationships between workplace 
characteristics and employee placement and mobility decisions. As the current work is 
focused on teacher employment preferences, this section will review the research specific 
to teacher workplace preferences. The teacher preference research includes analyses of 
teacher job applications, initial placements, job satisfaction, and teacher mobility 
decisions. In these studies, researchers have considered several factors affecting teacher 
labor market decisions, including school characteristics, salary, student population 
demographics, teacher peer groups, school facilities, administrative support, mentoring, 
and geography.  
Perceived job difficulty varies with the attributes of schools and the students who 
attend them. Given fixed salary schedules, schools often cannot offer higher wages to 
compensate for undesirable workplace characteristics. The most common payment 
schedule is where a teacher’s salary depends solely on their years of teaching experience 
and educational attainment. Salaries may vary across districts, however, and there is 
evidence that teachers will transfer to nearby districts that have higher salaries or remain 
in schools with higher salaries when wage variation exists.17 However, some research 
                                                 
17 Imazeki, 2005, Feng 2014, Feng 2009 
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finds that when teachers exit the profession, it is not in search of higher pay.18 Taken 
together, these findings suggest that salary is an important factor in placement decisions 
throughout a teacher’s work history, but that due to rigid wages, non-pecuniary factors 
are more important in subsequent transfer or exit decisions. This conclusion is further 
supported by its own body of research.19 However, as a contrast, the Talent Transfer 
Initiative offered substantial bonuses of twenty thousand dollars to high performing 
teachers if they transferred to high-needs schools. Few teachers even participated in the 
information session, let alone accepted the bonuses to transfer to low-performing schools 
(Glazerman et al., 2013).  
An additional body of research shows that teachers tend to move away from urban 
schools and schools with high portions of minority or low-income students.20 Urban 
schools also have lower application rates during the hiring process.21 Further research 
demonstrates that the movement away from schools with high portions of minority 
students is driven largely by the choices of white teachers. Black and Hispanic teachers 
seem to prefer schools with student and teacher22 or principal demographics (Grissom & 
Keiser, 2011) similar to their own. Additionally, teachers were found to move away from 
schools with substantial disciplinary problems (Feng, 2009, 2010). Teachers were also 
found to prefer supportive administrators and peers as well as mentorship opportunities.23  
                                                 
18 Podgursky et al., 2004; Scafidi et al., 2006; Stinebrickner, 2002 
19 Clotfelter et al., 2011, Hanushek & Rivkin 2007, Feng 2009 
20 Boyd et al. 2011; Lankford et al., 2002; Hanushek et al., 2004; Boyd et al., 2005a,b; Imazeki, 2005, Scafidi et al., 
2007; Feng, 2009; Goldhaber et al., 2011; Clotfelter et al., 2011; Feng & Sass, 2017; Goldhaber et al., 2015; West & 
Chingos, 2009; Neild et al., 2003; Hanushek & Rivkin 2007 
21 Levin & Quinn, 2003; Levin et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2008; Donaldson, 2013 
22 Strunk & Robinson 2006; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007 
23 Smith & Ingersoll, 2004; Ingersoll, 2001; Horng, 2009; Loeb et al., 2005 
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Location has also been shown to strongly affect teacher employment decisions. 
Teachers more frequently accept an initial placement in the area where they grew up 
(Reininger, 2012, Boyd et al., 2005a), where they attended college (Boyd et al., 2005a), 
close to their current home address (Boyd et al., 2005b, Boyd et al. 2013, Engel & 
Cannata, 2015), with a shorter commute (Engel et al., 2014; Horng 2009), or in a specific 
type of geography (Goff & Bruecker, 2017). In addition, teachers are found to prefer 
schools that have characteristics like those of their hometown (Boyd et al., 2005a). The 
geography of the district can affect subsequent mobility decisions as well. For example, 
transient teachers are less likely to move to geographically isolated districts (Neild et al., 
2003). 
Engel, Jacob, and Curran (2014) found that school characteristics strongly 
predicted application choices when studying behavior at the Chicago Public Schools job 
fair. However, Cannata (2010) found that if school-specific information is limited, 
teachers may make application decisions based on characteristics of the district as a 
whole. Both of these papers also find that applicants prefer schools with lower portions of 
minority students  
The hiring process can also affect labor supply decisions by imposing additional 
constraints on teacher choices. For example, increases in the amount of screening and 
certification requirements are negatively correlated with the number of candidates 
(Delfgaaw & Dur, 2007; DeVaro, 2005). However, the direction of causation is not 
entirely clear, as the supply of candidates can affect the way schools structure their hiring 
process (Rynes & Barber, 1990, Ryan & Tippins, 2004). Winter et al. (2004) find the 
attractiveness of a job offering to teachers is positively correlated with hiring-process 
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factors such as ease, length, and timeliness. Similarly, Rynes and Barber (1990) find that 
decreasing the application process length and the number of steps enhanced the 
attractiveness of a job to candidates. In addition to the hiring process, laws dictating 
evaluation standards can affect teacher choices. For example, the accountability standards 
imposed by the No Child Left Behind Act unintentionally exacerbated supply problems 
faced by high-needs schools by making schools with low-performing students less 
attractive to teachers (Rutledge et al., 2010). 
2.3. The School District’s Hiring Process 
Each year the studied school district, located in the Atlanta metropolitan area, fills 
roughly 600 teaching positions. Applications for these positions occur year-round but are 
concentrated in the period from January to August, as shown in Figure 1. Historically, a 
teacher candidate’s information would be available to principals in a hiring portal upon 
the submission of an online application and a simple background and credential check. 
For the past several years, however, the district has implemented changes to the teacher 
hiring process. The main change has been to provide principals additional information 
about teacher candidates through scores from a compatibility screener, GALLUP 
TeacherInsight, and a video interview tool, HireVue. In January 2019, obtaining a 
minimum score on the TeacherInsight test became a requirement for a candidate to enter 
the teacher candidate pool available to principals. However, this paper only studies 
applications through May 2018. The GALLUP TeacherInsight and HireVue tools are 
only applied to teachers new to the current district. The current teachers instead are 
limited by a transfer window which begins in March and ends in April. 
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Any candidate accepted into the candidate pool can apply for specific school-
subject positions or to generic pools such as middle-school math. Principals can then 
review the applications and offer interviews to candidates. After the interviews, 
principals make hiring requests to the district’s Human Resources Department, who then 
extends a formal offer (provided the candidate does not already have an outstanding offer 
from another school in the district). A teacher must reject their current offer to receive 
further offers from within the district.  
2.4. Data 
2.4.1 Partner District Administrative Data 
For the bulk of the analysis, I use employment and hiring data from the Human 
Resources Department of the studied school district. This means I have, when available, 
all information collected about every applicant during the hiring process, not just those 
that are hired. The data also include this information for the transfer process. The 
applicant’s address at the time of application was used to generate distance-to-school 
measures and the specific addresses will not be available to the researcher.   
2.5. Model  
This work builds upon the methodology used by Boyd et al. 2011, in their study 
of teacher retention and school choices regarding teacher transfer hires in New York City. 
However, in contrast to Boyd et al., I use all applications (both new and transfers), not 
just applications from currently-employed teachers seeking to transfer. In addition, I 
focus more on the impact of school characteristics, as opposed to the characteristics of 
the teacher. 
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While a variety of models have been employed by other researchers, the approach 
of Boyd, et al., seems most relevant for the current analysis. For example, I do not use the 
methods of Biasi (2019) as they emphasize preferences over payment methods, and no 
significant policy changes occurred in the districts and period I study. In addition, I use 
the method from Boyd et al., to capitalize on the application data, which were not 
available for Boyd et al. (2013). There are also several related papers in the 
compensating-wage literature, such as Lavetti (2020), which utilize changes in wages and 
benefits over time to identify worker preference. That approach is not feasible in the 
present context, where there were no significant changes in compensation or benefits. 
Other papers directly use employer- to-employer transfers analyzed within the revealed 
preference framework as Sorkin (2018). However, the revealed-preference literature 
either focuses on the direction of flows of workers or uses choice experiments to pin 
down the value of specific firm characteristics (Maestas et al., 2018; Wiswall & Zafar, 
2017), their methods, however, are infeasible for this work.  
For this work, the characteristics of schools studied have previously been studied 
and found to have effects on teacher preference in the prior literature. School quality 
measures of the GOSA school report card grade (performance and demographics) and the 
GADOE school climate measures (quality of school environment) are included to capture 
applicant preferences over readily available quality measures. Then due to the extensive 
literature about teacher flight from high-needs schools, I incorporated variables to 
represent the school's minority (percent of black or Hispanic) and poverty (percent of 
students directly certified for aid) status. Black and Hispanic were separated due to the 
studied district being primarily black in students and staff, so percent minority as an 
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aggregate variable may not have accurately demonstrated preferences. As the studied 
district is highly urban with no internal variation, this factor of traditionally high-needs 
schools was excluded. As defined by the number of students, the school's size was 
included to further capture preferences over readily observable school aspects. The 
principal characteristics were included as they are the primary interaction of the candidate 
with the school and, to a large extent, represent the school’s administrative environment.  
The applicant characteristics chosen for interactions were also carefully selected. 
Firstly applicant race with student race due to the extensive literature showing that by 
including the interaction, the results can be substantially different in magnitude and 
potentially even reverse the effects. In the previous chapter, applicant GPA represented 
applicant quality, so in this chapter, applicant GPA is interacted with all of the preference 
aspects to study if quality had noticeable effects on preferences, which could contribute 
to disparate distributions of quality teachers. There is similar reasoning behind including 
interactions with and applicant's teaching experience as this candidate aspect has been 
strongly related with teacher performance in the literature.   
2.5.1 Research Question: Which Schools are more likely to Receive Applications? 
Conditional on applying to the district, teachers can choose to apply to any school 
with an opening. The likelihood of a teacher applying to a school is modeled as a 
conditional logistic function.24 This particular estimation method was chosen to represent 
the application choice of teachers who must choose what schools to apply to amongst a 
set of alternatives. This approach allows unobserved characteristics of teacher to be 
                                                 
24 In addition to the conditional logit specification, a traditional logit estimation was run on the same analysis sample 
which yielded very similar results and is therefore not being added to this paper. 
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accounted for and provides more precise estimation of the teachers’ preferences. The 
model includes the interactions between each school's characteristics and a key set of 





′ 𝛽) + ∑ exp (𝑥𝑖′𝑗
′ 𝛽) 𝑖′𝜖𝐼^𝑗
                             (1) 
where i represents the school-subject in question and j all other alternatives. The 
choice set is constructed to be all schools with at least one hiring request in the school-
level/subjects the teacher applied to in the year of application. Therefore, equation (1) 
represents the odds of choosing alternative i of their choice set. The probability is a 
function of the characteristics of the school they apply to and the interactions with key 
teacher characteristics. When using conditional logit, due to the estimation being within a 
teacher’s choice set, any initial location effects and any teacher characteristic effects that 
are not interacted with the school drop out of the model since there is no variation. The 
analysis is split into applicants who have never worked in the district denoted as “New” 
pool, the transfer or “Current” applicant pool, and the combined or “All” applicant pool. 
In the analysis, I estimate seven specifications. The first only includes a single 
measure of school quality, the letter grade assigned to the school in the Governor’s Office 
of Student Achievement (GOSA) Georgia School Grades Report, with a grade of C being 
the omitted category. These grades are assigned based on the school performance on state 
assessments, the schools demographics, the graduation rate, and other accountability 
measures. In the second specification, I control for a set of characteristics I will group as 
“other school characteristics” including the Georgia Department of Education (GADOE) 
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school climate score, the percent of students directly certified,25 school size (measured by 
the number of students enrolled), the percent of students who are Black, and the percent 
of students who are Hispanic. In the third specification, I control for both sets of school 
characteristics (school grade and specific school characteristics). Then in the fourth, I 
also control for the characteristics of the principal of the school, namely their experience, 
evaluation score, and their years in the school. These three sets of controls are then used 
in the remaining three specifications, where in the fifth I also control for the interaction of 
student and applicant race. Then instead of applicant race, I interact the school grade and 
specific school characteristics with applicant teaching experience. In the last specification 
the characteristics as well as the principal characteristics are interacted with applicant 
GPA (a proxy for teacher quality) instead of experience. These key characteristics were 
selected based on prior research that demonstrates these school and applicant aspects are 
important to the labor market decisions of teachers. 
2.6. Results 
The estimation results for the sample of new applicants to the district are 
presented in Table 2.2. The first set of variables introduced are dummy variables for the 
school receiving a give GOSA School Report Card letter grade. The first specification 
includes only these variables and yields estimates that schools with a letter grade of F 
receive more applications than schools with a C grade, but that schools of other grades 
receive fewer applications. This result is true for all six specifications including these 
variables. This result may seem odd, as it suggests that teachers are most willing to apply 
                                                 
25 The students determined to be eligible for free or reduced-price meal based on certification directly from government 
agencies without the need for households to verify the need of the child. 
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to the schools rated the worst level. However, there are a few reasons this result can be 
plausible, and the underlying truth is likely to be a combination of factors. First, 
accountability pressure in high-ranked schools can cause intrinsic pressure to not apply to 
higher-ranked schools. The preference for less accountability pressure has been shown in 
Feng, Figlio, & Sass (2018). Further, these low-ranked schools may offer the lure of 
additional resources and rewards, as argued in Dizon-Ross, 2020. These additional 
benefits could be an extrinsic motivation towards applying to lower-ranked schools. 
There is also the possibility that higher-graded schools may be better able to utilize 
personal networks and thus reach out and determine their hire quickly, not leaving the 
window open long enough for most applicants to submit (Engel & Finch, 2015). In 
addition to the applicant motivations that could cause the estimates, the model is unable 
to account for the prevalence of alternatives due to following the Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives property meaning if a certain school aspect is overly prevalent in 
the possible options the model is unable to decrease its weight in the estimates. 
Therefore, due to the prevalence of F ranked schools in the district, the estimated result 
may appear if applicants apply randomly. However, I do not think this is the reason, as in 
that case, D ranked schools should also have a positive point estimate, which they do not.  
In addition to the GOSA letter grades, the number of students in the school, a 
descriptor of student poverty, the GADOE school climate score, and the portion of Black 
or Hispanic students were also incorporated into the analysis. The three non-race 
variables have interesting estimated impacts on application probabilities for the sample of 
new applicants; they differ from prior research findings regarding teacher preferences.  
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For all specifications, the number of students is positively related with application 
submission probabilities. There is the possibility that this sample of teachers finds appeal 
in larger schools, which may offer a larger professional learning community. It is more 
likely a result of the short-comings in the data set construction. As the choice set is made 
at the teacher-subject-school level, and any applications within that category are counted. 
Larger schools probably have more positions, increasing the likelihood that at least one of 
those positions appeals to the applicant. In addition, if the applicant applied to any 
positions in lower levels but were primarily targeting positions for a higher level this 
result could also occur. For example, if an applicant submitted an application for any 
middle school math position, all middle school math positions were placed in their choice 
set, but if that applicant was primarily applying to high schools which are by nature larger 
schools the estimate could be positive.  
Traditionally, in the teacher preference literature, the proportion of students 
experiencing poverty is associated with lower application probabilities and increased 
likelihood of teacher exit from a school. For the sample of new teachers though, there is 
either no relationship or a positive relation among student poverty and application 
probabilities.  This could coincide with the reasoning that struggling schools receive 
more resources, which balances with the teachers’ preference to teach more economically 
advantaged students. There is also the possibility that applicants to this district are aware 
that the district has a large portion or disadvantaged students, and therefore, that 
information does not factor into their choices. I posit that this same reasoning can be 
applied to the finding that the school climate score has a negative correlation with 
application probabilities.  
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Across specifications and samples there is a large negative relationship between 
the percent of students who are Black and the probability of the average candidate 
applying to a school. However, while together with the large effect on its own of the 
portion of Black students, the total effect is still negative, the likelihood a black candidate 
applies to a school increases with the proportion of students in the school who are black.  
There is also a negative correlation between the percentage of students who are Hispanic 
and the probability that the average candidate will apply to a school.  This negative 
correlation is even greater for Black candidates. These results support the previous 
research findings on teacher mobility that indicate white teachers are more likely to exit 
schools with high proportions of non-white students.  
New applicants are more likely to apply to schools with more experienced 
principals. Taken in isolation, this result could support the previous finding that teachers 
prefer more supportive principals26 or indicate that teachers prefer schools with greater 
staff stability. But when the negative estimated relationship with the principal’s duration 
in the school is also considered, the former explanation seems unlikely. The two variables 
association with application probabilities could indicate that teachers may be willing to 
follow a principal or be attracted by a change in a school led by an experienced principal. 
In the sixth specification, the GOSA School Grade variables, the school climate, 
size, as well as student poverty and race, are interacted with applicant experience. In the 
new-applicant sample, none of the coefficients on the interactions between applicant 
experience and school characteristics are statistically significant, indicating that the 
impact of school characteristics on candidate choices do not differ between new 
                                                 
26 Ingersoll, 2001; Horng, 2009; Loeb et al., 2005 
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applicants who have never taught and those with prior experience in other school 
districts. This result is not surprising as most new applicants have no prior experience, 
and those that do typically have few years of experience. 
The final set of interactions is between the applicant’s college GPA (a proxy for 
candidate quality) and the principal characteristics and the characteristics previously 
interacted with experience. Within the sample of new applicants, the likelihood of an 
prospective teacher to apply to schools with higher climate scores, greater portions of 
Hispanic students, and to Grade A, D, and F schools (relative to Grade C Schools) 
increases with higher applicant GPAs. Further, applicants having a higher GPA makes 
them less likely to apply to schools where the principal has a higher evaluation score or 
more experience. The direction of the interaction with principal evaluation scores, 
principal experience, and Grade-F interactions further compound on the existing effect of 
those variables when un-interacted on application submission likelihoods. The other 
significant interaction effects have directions opposing the un-interacted variable 
estimates, which with large enough magnitude could reverse the total effect at large 
enough GPA values. However, as GPA is on a scale of zero to four, there is no GPA an 
applicant can have to make the total effect positive. For example, the school having a 
Grade of A, the effect of the applicant having a GPA of four would still be -0.125 (-0.233 
+ (.027×4)). Having a higher GPA makes the estimates of the total effect closer to the 
current teacher sample, so possibly candidates with higher college GPAs are better able 
to gather information about their possible options.  
In discussing the results from the current-teacher sample I will compare my 
findings those of Boyd et al. (2011).  Though they employ different sample construction 
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and techniques, the two paper’s estimations yield similar results. Both studies find 
negative effects of the percent of students who are Black or Hispanic. Though the student 
population with the largest effect is different, (Hispanics in my sample and Blacks in 
Boyd et al, 2011); I believe this is due to the differences in the racial composition of the 
teachers (my sample is predominantly black while theirs has a large Hispanic 
population). Both studies find that greater student poverty and worse school climates are 
associated with lower probabilities of application to a school.  
The main area where we both have significant estimates, but opposing results, is 
school size. This result could be due to their inclusion of the school level (elementary, 
middle, high), and my sample construction, which as discussed for the new applicant 
estimation, is likely to have this unexpected positive result since larger schools having 
more openings for a single “position,” and the fact that different levels of schools are 
different sizes so if enough teachers prefer a high school when those are in their choice 
set this could lead to this positive effect of school size. 
There are a few areas where the results from the current-teachers and new-
applicant samples differ substantially; estimates for the effects of the school climate 
score, student poverty, and the interactions with GPA and experience all have 
qualitatively different estimated impacts on application probabilities. Current teachers 
follow the expected preferences regarding school climate scores and student poverty, 
while new applicants do not. A possible explanation for this difference is that current 
teachers have greater knowledge of the school system and are better able to direct their 
applications to the more desirable schools. Another possible reason is that current 
teachers may value “easier” teaching environments relatively more than do new teachers 
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who could have shorter planning horizons.  All current-teacher sample members have 
varying amounts of experience, while the reported GPAs have less variation. Therefore, 
the current-teachers sample has applicant experience interactions as statistically 
significant and GPA insignificant, which is a reverse of the new-applicant estimates. 
Because the distance to a school has been shown to be an important element of 
teacher preference over schools (Horng, 2009; Boyd et al., 2013; Engel & Cannata, 2015; 
Engel at al., 2014; Boyd et al., 2005b), I also estimate application probability models that 
account for the distance between a teacher’s residence and each school.  Unfortunately, 
address information is missing for many applicants, which lead to a roughly 50 percent 
reduction in the sample size. Further, it is likely that this reduced sample consists of a 
greater portion of fully completed applications. I believe this completion rate inference to 
be true due the fact that in every specification of new sample (Table 2.4), the direction of 
the relations are maintained, the magnitude is slightly increased, and the significance of 
the point estimates actually increased. For the sample of current teachers (Table 2.5), the 
inclusion of the distance variable generally either reduces or has no appreciable effect on 
the magnitude of the point estimates. This could suggest that location is a more important 
factor once a teacher is already in a position, and is seeking a transfer. In addition to the 
effect the inclusion of the distance variable has through the sample change, the distance 
point estimates are significant and, as expected, indicate that increases in distance to a 
school reduce the likelihood a candidate will apply, similar to the application choices at 
the Chicago job fair studied by Engel, Jacob, and Curran in 2014.  




This research provides an analysis of teacher application preferences in an Atlanta 
Metropolitan area school district. My main contribution to the extensive teacher 
preference literature is using the applications of prospective teachers to examine the 
preferences of teachers entering a school district. The majority of my findings for new 
teachers is consistent with the prior teacher preference research. Still, there are several 
notable exceptions: the school climate, student poverty, school size, and the GOSA 
School Report Card Grade. The new applicants were less likely to apply to schools with a 
higher climate score and more likely to apply to a school with a higher portion of 
economically disadvantaged students. This finding could result if positions in struggling 
or difficult schools are more likely to be supported with increased resources, or the 
vacancy is open longer due to the search being more difficult to complete and, therefore, 
more likely to be up during any given window an applicant is applying. The odd result 
for applicants being more likely to apply to schools with more students could also be due 
to the search duration of the school leading the position to be open for a longer time or 
could be a result of the sample construction whereby larger schools should have more 
vacancies posted, but I am unable to observe and therefore account for total vacancies.  
I also found that applicants were more likely to apply to schools with a GOSA 
School Report Card letter grade of F, and less likely to apply to the other grades as 
compared to grade C schools. There are several possible reasons. There is a higher 
prevalence of grade F schools in the school district and if applicants apply somewhat 
randomly is could seem they prefer grade F schools. In that case, though, there should 
also be an increase in applications to grade D schools, and there is not. It could also be 
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the preferences against accountability pressures previously found in Feng, Figlio, and 
Sass (2018) presenting in the application behavior, or preferences for increased resources 
and rewards that may be allocated to low-ranked schools, as shown in Dizon-Ross 
(2020). Furthermore, the result may due to the window of time the vacancy is posted in 
the higher graded schools is too short for the applicants to complete their submission. 
Engel and Finch (2015) found that higher-graded schools may have principals able to 
utilize their personal networks to quickly complete their hiring process.  
In general, my findings for current teachers are also consistent with those from 
previous studies in the teacher preference literature. The primary exceptions are the 
GOSA School Report Card and the number of students in a school, though they could be 
explained by the factors discussed above for new applicants results discussed above.  
Also, my results indicate a negative relationship between application probabilities and the 
evaluation scores of a school’s principal. This evaluation score effect could mean that the 
evaluation is capturing portions of the principal’s performance, which are unappealing to 
teachers, and current teachers can capitalize on this information due to informal 
information networks and apply elsewhere. If this is the reason behind the evaluation 
result, then the evaluating entity may want to consider changing the measure to better 
reflect the ability of the principal to attract teachers.   
Together the findings for the new applicants and current teachers could support 
the notion that teachers, as they progress in the profession, increasingly value “easier-to-
teach” positions and leverage their knowledge of the school system to obtain them. 
Regardless, the differences mean that efforts to change a school’s appeal to candidates 
should account for potentially varying impacts prospective teachers. For example, if a 
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school is attempting to attract current teachers, they should demonstrate that the school 
climate is improving even if they cannot affect the student population. For both current 
and new teachers, the distance of the school from their residence had a negative relation 
with application probabilities. Therefore if the system was able to offer housing subsidies 
to live close to the schools, they may be able to entice more applicants to those schools.  




Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 







Dev. Min Max 
Applied to the 
position 0.116 0.321 0.108 0.310 0.160 0.366 0 1 
GADOE School 
Climate Score 
(STAR) 3.118 1.057 3.120 1.053 3.110 1.077 0 5 
GADOE School 
Climate Score 
(STAR) missing 0.050 0.217 0.049 0.216 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Percent of Students 
Directly Certified 60.270 26.438 60.230 26.454 60.474 26.356 0 91.9 
Percent of Students 
Directly Certified 
Missing 0.025 0.155 0.024 0.151 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Number of 
Students (100s) 6.665 2.669 6.648 2.643 6.754 2.802 0 20.09 
Percent of Students 
Black 0.775 0.314 0.775 0.313 0.773 0.317 0 1 
Percent of Students 
Hispanic 0.075 0.101 0.076 0.101 0.074 0.100 0 0.540 
GOSA Report Card 
Grade A 0.110 0.313 0.110 0.313 0.109 0.312 0 1 
GOSA Report Card 
Grade B 0.073 0.260 0.073 0.260 0.073 0.261 0 1 
GOSA Report Card 
Grade C 0.107 0.308 0.109 0.311 0.096 0.294   
GOSA Report Card 
Grade D 0.302 0.459 0.305 0.461 0.286 0.452 0 1 
GOSA Report Card 
Grade F 0.365 0.481 0.360 0.480 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Principal 
Experience 10.670 9.778 10.676 8.982 10.638 9.078 0 42.5 
Principal 
Experience 
Missing 0.105 0.307 0.105 0.306 0.106 0.308   
Principal 
Evaluation Score 16.814 2.055 16.836 2.048 16.700 2.086 12 23 
Principal 
Evaluation Score 
Missing 0.062 0.241 0.060 0.237 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Principal Years in 
the School 3.791 2.812 3.805 2.804 3.720 2.847 0 17 
Principal Years in 
the School Missing 0.060 0.237 0.061 0.240 0.051 0.221 0 1 
Black Applicant 0.806 0.395 0.807 0.395 0.803 0.398 0 1 
White Applicant 0.171 0.377 0.171 0.376 0.1773 0.378 0 1 
Non-White Other 
Applicant 0.023 0.149 0.023 0.149 0.024 0.153 0 1 




Missing 0.148 0.355 0.126 0.332 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Applicant College 
GPA 2.174 1.497 2.103 1.516 2.521 1.346   
Applicant College 
GPA Missing 0.334 0.472 0.359 0.480 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Applicant Teaching 
Experience 2.881 5.297 2.079 4.344 6.922 7.403 0 56 
Applicant Teaching 
Experience 
Missing 0.019 0.138 0.022 0.146 0.008 0.086 0 1 
Applicant Distance 
to the School 171.768 581.807 189.967 620.486 64.872 224.677 0.059 14045 
Applicant Distance 
to the School 
Missing 0.452 0.498 0.438 0.496 0.522 0.500 0 1 
N 533,806 446,423 87,383  
Notes: N is for the total sample. These summary statistics are unsuppressed in the regressions the mean will 
be lower because all missing values are replaced with zero and an indicator for missing is included.  
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Table 2.2 Application Estimations for New Applicants-Relevant School Level-Subject Choice Set 

















Grade A -0.043***  -0.150*** -0.171*** -0.174*** -0.169*** -0.233*** 
 (0.006)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Grade B -0.118***  -0.097*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.126*** 
 (0.007)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Grade D -0.046***  -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Grade F 0.048***  0.043*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.010** 






















 -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 




 0.002*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
 0.004*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percent of 
Students Black 
 -0.183*** -0.204*** -0.246*** -0.304*** -0.245*** -0.263*** 




 -0.344*** -0.409*** -0.397*** -0.356*** -0.399*** -0.544*** 

















Experience    0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Evaluation Score    -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years in the 
School 
   -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




































 Black × Black     0.081***   
     (0.008)   
Black × Non-
White Other 
    0.024   
    (0.017)   
Hispanic × Black     -0.068***   
     (0.017)   
Hispanic × Non-
White Other  
    -0.086   

























Card Grade A  
     -0.001  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
     0.000  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D  
     -0.000  
     (0.000)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
     -0.001  
































     -0.000  
     (0.000)  
Number of 
Students (100s)  
     0.000*  
     (0.000)  
Percent of 
Students Black  
     -0.000  




     0.001  
     (0.002)  




























Card Grade A  
      0.027*** 
      (0.003) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
      0.003 
      (0.002) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D 
      0.018*** 
      (0.002) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
      0.005*** 




      0.001* 
      (0.000) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
      -0.000 




      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Percent of 
Students Black  
      0.010 




      0.066*** 
      (0.009) 
Principal Years 
in the School  
      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Evaluation Score  
      -0.000*** 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Experience  
      -0.001*** 
      (0.000) 
 N 444,403 444,403 444,403 444,403 444,403 444,403 444,403 
Notes: For each of the non-interacted variables there is a non-reported indicator equal to one if the variable was missing and zero if not. 
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Table 2.3 Application Estimations for Current Teachers-Relevant School Level-Subject Choice Set 

















Grade A 0.004  -0.176*** -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.149** -0.167*** 
 (0.011)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
Grade B -0.068***  -0.117*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.086*** -0.118*** 
 (0.012)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) 
Grade D -0.053***  0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.012* -0.016 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) 
Grade F -0.037***  0.046*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.017 





















 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.009** 




 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Percent of 
Students Black 
 0.037 -0.097*** -0.080*** -0.163*** -0.123*** -0.078 




 -0.031 -0.279*** -0.210*** -0.212*** -0.252*** -0.188*** 

















Experience    0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Evaluation Score    -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the 
School 
   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 




































Black × Black     0.135***   
     (0.020)   
Black × Non-
White Other 
    -0.003   
    (0.049)   
Hispanic × Black     0.005   
     (0.034)   
Hispanic × Non-
White Other  
    -0.076   

























Card Grade A  
     0.001  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
     -0.004***  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D  
     -0.003***  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
     -0.003***  
































     -0.000**  
     (0.000)  
Number of 
Students (100s)  
     -0.000  
     (0.000)  
Percent of 
Students Black  
     0.007**  




     0.007**  
     (0.003)  




























Card Grade A  
      0.009 
      (0.007) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
      0.004 
      (0.005) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D 
      0.005 
      (0.004) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
      0.002 




      -0.001 
      (0.001) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
      0.000 




      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Percent of 
Students Black  
      -0.001 




      -0.009 
      (0.012) 
Principal Years 
in the School  
      0.000 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Evaluation Score  
      0.000 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Experience  
      -0.000* 
      (0.000) 
 N 86,747 86,747 86,747 86,747 86,747 86,747 86,747 
Notes: For each of the non-interacted variables there is a non-reported indicator equal to one if the variable was missing and zero if not. 
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Table 2.4 Application Estimations for New Applicants-Including a Distance Variable  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Distance to the 
School 
-0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 

















Grade A -0.055***  -0.181*** -0.223*** -0.225*** -0.221*** -0.306*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
Grade B -0.122***  -0.127*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.161*** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) 
Grade D -0.046***  -0.003 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.058*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
Grade F 0.045***  0.076*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 





















 -0.006*** -0.000 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified 
 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
 0.007*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Percent of 
Students Black 
 -0.089*** -0.137*** -0.227*** -0.288*** -0.223*** -0.194*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) 
Percent of 
Students Hispanic 
 -0.189*** -0.353*** -0.412*** -0.361*** -0.414*** -0.565*** 

















Experience    0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Evaluation Score    0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the 
School 
   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 




































Black × Black     0.092***   
     (0.011)   
Black × Non-
White Other 
    0.013   
    (0.028)   
Hispanic × Black     -0.079***   
     (0.025)   
Hispanic × Non-
White Other  
    -0.178**   

























Card Grade A  
     -0.001  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
     0.000  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D  
     -0.000  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
     -0.002**  




























     (0.000)  
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified  
     0.000  
     (0.000)  
Number of 
Students (100s)  
     0.000  
     (0.000)  
Percent of 
Students Black  
     -0.002  
     (0.004)  
Percent of 
Students Hispanic  
     0.001  
      (0.003)  




























Card Grade A  
      0.036*** 
      (0.005) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
      0.004 
      (0.004) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D 
      0.016*** 
      (0.003) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
      -0.004 




      0.001 
      (0.001) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified 
      0.000* 
      (0.000) 
Percent of 
Students Black  
      -0.010 
      (0.012) 
Percent of 
Students Hispanic  
      0.068*** 
      (0.014) 
Principal Years in 
the School  
      0.000 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Evaluation Score  
      -0.001*** 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Experience  
      -0.002*** 
      (0.000) 
 N 254,964 254,964 254,964 254,964 254,964 254,964 254,964 
Notes: For each of the non-interacted variables there is a non-reported indicator equal to one if the variable was missing and zero if not. 
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Table 2.5 Application Estimations for Current Teachers-Including a Distance Variable 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Distance to the 
School 
-0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** 

















Grade A -0.029*  -0.167*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.134*** 
 (0.016)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.027) 
Grade B -0.096***  -0.121*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.078*** -0.106*** 
 (0.016)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.027) 
Grade D -0.025**  0.021** 0.003 0.002 0.011 -0.018 
 (0.011)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) 
Grade F -0.036***  0.045*** 0.010 0.009 0.019** -0.001 





















 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified 
 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
 0.008*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Percent of 
Students Black 
 0.105** -0.047 -0.026 -0.106*** -0.072* -0.029 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.035) (0.031) (0.038) (0.060) 
Percent of 
Students Hispanic 
 0.085* -0.162*** -0.091*** -0.066 -0.132*** -0.036 
















s Experience    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Evaluation Score    -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years in the 
School 
   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 




































Black × Black     0.122***   
     (0.026)   
Black × Non-
White Other 
    0.013   
    (0.053)   
Hispanic × Black     -0.038   
     (0.039)   
Hispanic × Non-
White Other  
    -0.184   

























Card Grade A  
     0.000  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
     -0.004**  
     (0.002)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D  
     -0.002*  
     (0.001)  
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
     -0.002*  




























     (0.000)  
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified  
     -0.000**  
     (0.000)  
Number of 
Students (100s)  
     -0.000  
     (0.000)  
Percent of 
Students Black  
     0.009**  
     (0.004)  
Percent of 
Students Hispanic  
     0.008**  
      (0.004)  




























Card Grade A  
      0.008 
      (0.008) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade B  
      0.004 
      (0.006) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade D 
      0.008* 
      (0.005) 
GOSA Report 
Card Grade F  
      0.004 




      0.000 
      (0.001) 
Number of 
Students (100s) 
      -0.000 
      (0.001) 
Percent of Student 
Directly Certified 
      -0.000 
      (0.000) 
Percent of 
Students Black  
      0.001 
      (0.020) 
Percent of 
Students Hispanic  
      -0.021 
      (0.022) 
Principal Years in 
the School  
      0.000 
      (0.001) 
Principal 
Evaluation Score  
      0.000 
      (0.000) 
Principal 
Experience  
      -0.000* 
      (0.000) 
 N 42,267 42,267 42,267 42,267 42,267 42,267 42,267 
Notes: For each of the non-interacted variables there is a non-reported indicator equal to one if the variable was missing and zero if not. 
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3. Who Knew? An Experimental Examination of Information Effects on a Teacher 
Labor Market 
3.1 Introduction 
Several studies find that teachers are the most important school provided input 
into a child’s education,27 in addition to being an anecdotal truth believed by most people. 
However, there has been shown to be a disparity in access to quality teachers between 
key student sub-groups. The disparity can occur due to differential job mobility patterns28 
or in the hiring process,29 making the teacher labor market of particular interest.  
Further research has shown that the quality of the match between the teacher and 
the school, how well the teacher fits in with their peers and students can also affect the 
teacher’s ability to contribute to their students’ growth.30 An additional benefit of a good 
teacher-school match is that it increases the likelihood of prolonged tenure at the school, 
which is of particular interest as experience is a teacher aspect positively related to 
student achievement consistently.31 Improving the way teachers match to schools during 
the hiring process seems an attractive intervention to improve equity in accessibility and 
quality of education. Lastly, improving teacher tenure through improving their matches to 
schools decreases the teacher turnover rate and, in turn, decreases the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs of turnover,32 allowing those resources to be directed into further helping 
student achievement.  
                                                 
27 Rivkin et al., 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2008 
28 Darling-Hammond, 2001; Viadero 2002; Gordon & Maxey, 2000; Goldhaber et al. 2007; Feng & Sass, 2017 
29 Sass, et al., 2012; Reininger, 2012 
30 Jackson, 2013 
31 Chingos & Peterson, 2011; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; Rivkin et al., 2005; Clotfelter et al., 2006; Dobbie, 2011; 
Wiswall, 2013; Papay & Kraft, 2015; Rockoff, 2004 
32 Milanowski & Odden 2007; Guin, 2004 
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The possible benefits of improving matching in the teacher labor market stress the 
importance of identifying behaviorally stable and efficient matching procedures between 
teachers and schools. In this chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to examine the effect 
of information about the teachers’ competitors on (i) teachers’ choices of signaling their 
quality, (ii) the efficiency of the matching market, and (iii) the market stability. The 
experimental design allows the identification of the effect of the information as I control 
for the environment, namely the productivity of teacher-school pairing, a challenging task 
for observational data. A novel feature of the experimental design is the integration of the 
matching mechanism and (Spence) signaling model. These two models, widely used in 
economic literature, will be described in detail later in this paper.  
Matching markets theory offers a framework to model the teacher labor market I 
am examining. The matching markets framework was initially designed to represent the 
marriage market and the housing market (Gale & Shapley 1962) but has since been used 
in many contexts such as medical residency placements (Roth & Xing, 1994, 1997; Kagel 
& Roth, 2000; Roth, 1984, 1991) organ transplants (Roth et al., 2005), and school 
assignments (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005; Chen & Sönmez, 2006). The procedure I use 
will be called the school hiring (SH) mechanism for the rest of this paper. The model is 
based on the partner school district studied in the two other chapters of this dissertation. 
However, in the markets modeled, there are varying levels of information. I examine the 
effect of information about competitors on applicants’ choices and how school 
assignments are affected by teachers’ strategic actions. It is hard to identify quality 
teachers in the hiring process. A lot of the initial judgment stems from credentials, which 
should be easier to achieve for high-type teachers when aligned adequately to teacher 
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quality. Examples of possible ability signals are licensure test scores, college selectivity, 
college grade point average, and the degrees obtained. 
Embedding a signaling model of applicant productivity in a two-sided matching 
market is the main contribution of this experiment to the existing experimental economics 
literature. Hopkins first developed the combination of the Spence model with the 
matching markets framework in 2012. The concept of combining a two-sided matching 
market with signaling was further expanded by Coles et al. (2013). However, Hopkins 
focused on the effects of matching markets on the signaling equilibrium, and Coles et al. 
focused on signals of interest. I use a two by two design of homogenous or heterogeneous 
preferences over partners and additional versus no additional information in my 
experiment. The purpose of the experiment is to generate data than can inform on the 
effect of information on signaling investments and the market efficiency and stability of 
the observed matches. 
I examine information value in a lab setting for several reasons. The first being 
that any policy interventions should be evidence based before being imposed on the 
actual labor market. Creating that data as a survey has a problem regarding the difficulty 
of ensuring the salience of answers and being unable to represent the market's two-sided 
nature. Then, even if I could find districts following the treatments, the administrative 
data would be so complicated that empirical identification would still be difficult. The 
data issues are especially true for estimating market efficiency and payoffs, given that 
many of the benefits teachers and schools receive from a given match cannot clearly be 
measured due to being subjective. Besides, in the actual labor market, schools and 
teachers can seek additional information outside of the signals, through methods such as 
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interviews, phone calls, and personal connections. Many of these interactions are never 
recorded, thus muddling that aspect of an empirical analysis. 
Further there are a plethora of hiring process variations which can affect the 
match outcomes, such as teachers using the placement as a way to transfer somewhere 
more preferred (indicating the markets are unstable),33 collective bargains,34 and other 
policies that can disrupt placement planning.35 More importantly, when empirically 
studying the existing labor market, both the schools’ and teachers’ true preferences are 
unknown, meaning the market must be stable to allow for the calculation of self-sorting 
(Boyd et al., 2013). The market I am interested in studying empirically is not stable based 
on the large amounts of mobility.36 A further complication preventing studying this 
question using observational data is that the geographic area I am studying has many 
competing sub-markets causing the system to be very complex and challenging to 
empirically model. Creating a controlled market and observing participants’ decisions in 
this market, I can develop an initial understanding of how information can affect 
applicants’ behavior in a two-sided matching market with the SH mechanism.  
In light of these difficulties arising from asymmetric information, when and what 
agents know becomes crucial. In the experiment, all signaling investments are 
simultaneous in one treatment (the baseline), whereas in another treatment, investments 
are sequential. That is, investments occur in random order and workers observe all earlier 
investments. Also, to examine how the degree of competitiveness in the labor market 
                                                 
33 Reininger 2012; Boyd et al. 2005a,b; Boyd et al. 2013 
34 Strunk et al. 2018; Levin et al., 2005 
35 DeArmond et al., 2010; Cohen-Vogel et al., 2019; Heneman & Milanowski 2004, 2007 
36 Ingersoll, 2001; Hanushek et al., 2004; Scafidi et al., 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2011; Feng, 2009; Jackson, 2013; 
Goldhaber et al., 2011 
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affects the outcomes, I induce two preference sets in the experiment. I used these two 
preference sets to study agents' choices when preferences are identical (competitive) or 
heterogeneous (reduced competition).  
The theoretical model (discussed in section 3.3) guided the parameterization of 
the experiment. The participants in the experiment were Georgia State University 
students recruited using the ExCEN online recruiter. After participants completed the 
matching markets portion of the experiment, I also collected their demographic 
information and behavior on a risk elicitation task, to control for individual idiosyncratic 
characteristics.  
Data from the experiment suggests that heterogeneous preferences decrease 
agents investment amounts when not participating in the information treatment. Further, 
the information treatment negatively impacts investment amounts when preferences are 
homogenous. The information treatment also leads to the signaling investments revealing 
worker type less often. The treatment has no effect however on market efficiency, but the 
preferences being homogenous does result in higher efficiency. The information 
treatment negatively affects firms’ payoffs when preferences are heterogeneous, but 
positively affects firms’ payoffs when preferences are homogenous. However, no single 
firm type bore the brunt of the effects of information. Regarding market stability, the 
stability was higher for when the preferences were homogenous.  
3.2 Literature Review: 
In 1962, the matching markets framework was formalized by Gale and Shapley to 
model college admissions and marriage market stability. This initial paper proposed the 
Deferred Acceptance procedure, where agents from one side (the man or applicant) issue 
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an offer to one agent from the other side (the woman or college). The side receiving 
offers can receive multiple offers and decides which to keep. Rejected agents then issue 
offers to their next preferred, and so forth until no more rejections occur. The mechanism 
is strategy-proof for the applicants (no applicant has an incentive to misrepresent their 
preferences) and stable (no pair of applicant and college would both prefer each other 
over their assigned partner). However, markets using Deferred Acceptance are not always 
efficient, so in some cases, agents' total payoffs could increase in a non-equilibrium 
solution (Roth, 1982). 
The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is widely used and studied; however, for 
this experiment, the matching procedure studied bears greater similarity to the Priority 
(Boston) matching algorithm. The Priority algorithm is most easily described in the 
context of student placements to Boston Public Schools in the early 2000s, such as in the 
works of Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) and Chen & Sönmez (2006). The schools each 
have a priority ranking of all students based on several factors such as siblings, distance, 
etc. While knowing the schools at which they had priority, students created a preference 
ranking of schools to be submitted to the system for the assignment procedure. In the first 
round, schools accepted any students within capacity constraints. If they had a surplus of 
applicants, they retained students in the order of priority. Students who were not assigned 
enter the second round of placements. The same procedure takes place at their second-
ranked school, but if the seat has already been filled, being a priority student will not 
allow the student to receive a spot in the school. The matching procedure continues for as 
many rounds as are needed to assign each student a school. This assignment procedure 
gives students (the agents placing active offers or rankings) a strong incentive to 
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strategically order their preferences, such that schools for which they have priority are 
ranked higher on their submitted preferences than in their true preferences. The strategic 
ranking allows the students to receive a better final assignment than if they submitted 
their true preferences. The primary difference between the Priority mechanism and the 
School Hiring mechanism used in this paper is that those being proposed to can reject an 
offer even if their quota is not full. This should not change the theoretical properties that 
we would expect in a priority matching environment. 
In addition to school assignment procedures, the Priority procedure has also 
appeared in US and European medical student residency markets. The procedure was the 
most commonly used unstable algorithm. The residency markets often were unstable 
(leading to next period rematching) or matched unreasonably early. When introducing 
various procedures into these markets as field experiments, the early matching only 
decreased modestly under the priority algorithm, and instability increased (Roth, 1984, 
1991). 
For this experiment, agents also cannot defer acceptance, and thus workers must 
reject their current offer to receive future offers. These workers may then accept a less 
preferred partner early in the market to avoid the outcome of no or worse matches. The 
main difference from the traditionally studied Priority algorithm is that for one side of the 
market type (true productivity) is private information. Those agents must then use a 
costly signal to demonstrate their type. Agents still have incentives to misrepresent their 
preferences or type (act strategically) to make a better match like in the original Priority 
procedure. This paper aims to determine if additional information regarding competitor 
actions or the competition created by similar preferences impacts strategic behavior. 
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The model incorporated into two-sided matching markets to characterize the 
incomplete information regarding agent type is the Spence signaling model (Spence 
1973). In the model, workers know their productivity, but this information is not known 
to firms. Agents signal their productivity by making costly investments where cost is 
inversely related to productivity. Firms then observe signaling investments. The workers 
can chose investment amounts (a separating equilibrium) that allow firms to determine 
worker types or the workers can choose to invest the same amount (a pooling 
equilibrium) or other amounts which result in firms being unable to determine worker 
type. In the original (Spence) signaling game, their investments did not increase 
productivity, and thus any amount of investment was socially inefficient. In this 
experiment, the investment will be productivity increasing, with the increases occurring 
at units 1, 4, and 7 to mimic preparation program completion effects, allowing the 
investment to represent a properly-aligned signal of teacher quality. 
Both the Spence Signaling Game and Matching Markets have been extensively 
tested experimentally, and developed theoretically, in isolation. Researchers have tested 
variation in the Spence Signaling game regarding the equilibrium type,37 behavior,38 and 
the signal’s purpose.39 The research within the Matching Markets literature has covered a 
variety of matching mechanisms40 comparative statics (Hopkins, 2012), levels of 
asymmetric information,41 utility transferability (Becker, 1973, 1974), market types,42 
                                                 
37 Brandts & Holt, 1992; Banks et al., 1994; Cho & Kreps, 1987 
38 Cooper & Kagel, 2003; Potters & van Winden, 1996 
39 Coles et al., 2013; Miller & Plott, 1985; Kübler et al., 2008 
40 Gale & Shapley, 1962; Shapley & Scarf, 1974; Roth, 1982, 1984, 1991; Roth & Xing, 1994, 1997; Hylland & 
Zuckhauser, 1972; Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez, 1999; Sönmez & Ünver, 2011; Chen & Sönmez, 2003 
41 Hopkins, 2012; Bikhchandani, 2017; Ehlers & Masso, 2015; Chen & Sönmez, 2003; Coles et al., 2013; Hoppe et al., 
2009 
42 Gale & Shapley, 1962; Roth & Xing, 1997; Roth, 1991; Roth et al., 2004; Chen & Sönmez, 2006 
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and preference types (Becker, 1973, 1974). The listed research listed are examples in a 
large body of experimental and theoretical work. This work shows that properties of 
matching market outcomes can vary dramatically with the information environment.  
Other experimentalists and theorists have developed research regarding the effects 
of introducing varied preferences of the agents to study the impact on behavior and 
prevent preference-specific results. Additional researchers have introduced information 
asymmetry into two-side matching markets. Coles et al., 2013 developed a matching 
market experiment that introduced signals as an element of the market. In their market, 
the signals were to demonstrate interest or enthusiasm for the match in a congested hiring 
market as preferences were private information. Also, in their experiment the worker 
quality is known to firms and thus public information. The researchers show that signals 
benefit searchers, do not harm employers, and work best under balanced markets. For the 
signal to work, the number of signals must be limited. The study also examined the 
effects of block correlated preferences, which are useful when firms have multiple 
attributes by allowing for idiosyncrasies within worker preferences. In their experiment, 
they have only one block, and the match's quality does not change due to the preferences, 
so just being able to create any match is the target outcome. 
In my model and experimental design, I draw upon various previous studies on 
signaling games and matching procedures but did focus on insights from works focused 
on the role of information on the market performance. This paper is not the first to 
theoretically combine the two models (that honor goes to Hopkins, 2012). Still, it is the 
first to examine it experimentally, and the focus of the theory is substantially different to 
reflect the questions of interest in the experiment. 
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3.3 Theoretical Model 
3.3.1 Assumptions 
1) There is a one-to-one matching between teachers and schools. 
2) There is a set of schools seeking to fill one teaching position.43 
3) The sets of possible investment levels, teacher types, and school types are finite.  
3.3.2 Information Environment 
All agents' preferences over agents on the other side of the market are unknown to 
the other agents and are private information. The school types are public information, 
known to all. Each teacher knows their true value over matching with any possible 
school. Teacher type is private information, known only to the teacher. All agents know 
the set of possible teacher and school characterizations or types. The differences between 
types are modeled by varying the matches' productivity, and their investment cost 
represents the teacher's general productivity. There are three types of workers and three 
types of firms in the experiment. In each market, there is one of each type of firm and 
worker. Members of the market are unable to directly associate a type with a given 
teacher. Teachers attempt to signal their types to the schools by making costly 
investments. The investments are visible to all schools, all teachers when offers are being 
made, and any teacher investing afterward in the Information treatment.  Assigning the 
match benefits induces the agents' preferences towards their possible partners. The 
schools can infer a teacher's true type from their investment choice. There are high, 
medium, and low general productivity teacher types represented in their investment cost, 
                                                 
43 This assumption appears to be strong, given that schools have many teachers and are often hiring more than one in a 
year. However, this assumption operates using the concept that the positions available at a school are often vastly 
different, resulting in disparate search efforts, and thus the final match is similar to a one-to-one match. 
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which are 10, 20, and 30, respectively. The firm types are 1, 2, and 3 defined by their 
preference structure (which is identical in the competitive treatment) and the differential 
productivity of their matches. 
3.3.3 Wage Structure 
Given that I am modeling the teacher labor market, I use a somewhat novel wage 
structure. Generally, in the teacher labor market, the wage structure is rigid, with salary 
being determined by where the teacher's experience and educational attainment place 
them in a fixed salary schedule. The schedule means all new teachers with a bachelor's 
degree earn essentially the same starting wage within a school system. Due to this 
rigidity, non-pecuniary benefits of the match drive teacher preferences over schools 
(Scafidi et al., 2007; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007). These benefits consist of location (Boyd 
et al., 2005a, b; Reininger, 2012), the characteristics of the student population at the 
school, the perceived quality of the faculty and leadership, and a range of other factors.44 
Instilling non-pecuniary preferences in the participants would not be salient, so to 
parameterize these benefits, there is a school-specific wage the teachers received upon a 
match. The benefits vary by the match and change only once during the experiment. I 
could have parameterized investment with no productivity returns, as Spence did in his 
1973 work. However, as the teacher wage has an adjustment to salary schedule based on 
degree attainment, I decided to have the hybrid fixed payments as in Table 3.1. These 
payments jump at specific investment values but remain the same in the interim.  
                                                 
44 Lankford et al., 2002; Hanushek et al., 2004; Imazeki, 2005; Feng, 2009; Feng & Sass, 2017; Goldhaber et al., 2015; 
West & Chingos 2009 
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In the experiment, teachers and schools always receive a payment of 300 for 
matching with their top choice, 200 from the second, and 100 from the bottom choice. 
Table 3.2 presents the two preferences sets. The first set of preferences were chosen to be 
the most competitive, given that all participant preferences are identical. The second set 
of preferences decreases competition and increase the discordance between agents' 
preferences over the other side. The choice of these two sets of preferences was to 
prevent the results from being preference structure dependent.  
3.3.4 Investment 
Given the parameterization, the investment which will afford a teacher the 
greatest payoff at each firm is 7 for a high type teacher, 4 for medium, and 1 for low. If 
the teacher adopts a maximin strategy or believes that they have an equal probability of 
matching with any given school, these would be the teachers' optimal investment. There 
would be a separation of investment, revealing the teacher types.45 
The maximum payoff for the market requires that high types invest 7, medium 
types invest 4, and low types invest 1 resulting in investment payoffs of 100, 40, and 10. 
If investments for each type deviate, this causes their investment payoff to decrease, 
decreasing the maximum possible total payoff for the market. If a worker cannot make a 
match, the cost of over-investment is greater as they also do not receive the payment for 
investment.46 If they can make a match, overinvestment is offset for most types by the 
additional pay from investment, especially for high type workers.47 Under the 
                                                 
45 Separation occurring is likely to be impacted by workers making strategic investments to obtain more preferred 
matches. This is not studied directly in this paper, but the theory is discussed in Appendix A. 
46 For high types, if they make no match and have invested nine instead of their maximin seven, or lower values like 
six, they receive a payoff of negative ninety versus negative seventy or sixty. 
47 For high types, if they invest eight instead of seven their payoff is ninety plus the match payoff instead of when they 
underinvest at six only receiving sixty plus the match payoff. 
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competitive (homogenous) preferences, it is expected that the overinvestment will be 
greater, as agents have the most direct benefit of presenting themselves as the high type. 
If the worker achieves a better match of one rank by investing more, the worker's 
payoff always increases. This means that under the competitive preferences, where the 
highest investor should match with the best firm, an agent will invest more than their 
competitors' investment when they can. Due to the incentive to misrepresent their type, 
agents are more likely to do so when they have more information about their competitors' 
actions and are thus able to pick their apparent type decreasing the likelihood investment 
is in a type revealing ranking.48 
Hypothesis 1: Agents will invest more when the preference rankings are 
homogenous.   
Hypothesis 2: Agents will invest more if they observe higher competitor 
investment under competitive preferences.  
Hypothesis 3: Agents are less likely to engage in separating investment in the 
information treatment. 
                                                 
48 In preference set 1, (7, 4, 1) is not an equilibrium because the medium worker has an incentive to deviate and invest 
8. (7, 4,1 ) is also not an equilibrium in preference set 2 as the low type worker has incentive to deviate and invest 8, or 
the high and medium type workers have incentive to deviate and invest 1. However, there is a partial pooling 
equilibrium in the simultaneous investment game of 9, 9, 1. High has no incentive to deviate as the expected payoff 
from investing 9 due to ties being broken randomly is 330, which is greater than the most profitable deviation of 
investing 7 and earning 300. The medium worker has no incentive to deviate as the expected payoff from investing 9 is 
240, which is equal to the payoff from the  most profitable deviation of investing 4 and being assigned to firm 2 (as 
high’s investment is 9). Low has no incentive to deviate as low’s payoff from investing 1 is 110 which is larger than the 
most profitable deviation of investing 9, which results in and being equally likely assigned to either firm and an 
expected payoff of 100. For preference set 2, non-type revealing separating equilibrium is (7, 0, 8). High type has no 
reason to deviate because as they receive 300 and the expected payoff of their next best investment 0 is 250. The 
medium type has no reason to deviate because while they could obtain more at 4 this would make 0 the best option for 
the high type decreasing medium types payoff at four. Low type has no incentive to deviate as their next best payoff is 
210 when investing 1 as opposed to their current payoff of 230. 
       
102 
 
3.3.5 Matching Mechanism 
In the experiment, I use a decentralized design where offers are transmitted 
directly from schools to teachers to elicit behavior as similar to the real labor market as 
possible, given that the actual market is decentralized. The other matching market 
possibility is centralized, where all agents list their preferences and submit them to a 
central matching organization. It is important to reemphasize that the primary difference 
between this mechanism, and the priority matching mechanism is that those being 
proposed to can reject an offer even if their quota is not full. This should not change the 
theoretical properties that we would expect in a priority matching environment. 
3.3.5.1 The School Hiring Mechanism  
1) Teachers know school types, own type, and the distribution of competitor types. They 
also know all of their possible payoffs from each combination of investment and 
match.  
2) After observing the available information, teachers choose an amount of investment.  
3) Once a teacher’s investment is chosen, they apply to all schools. This is the point 
when schools can observe the teachers' investments. 
4) Schools cannot observe true types, but they do observe all investments and make 
decisions on offers to workers.  
5) Round 1.  
a. Schools issue their first an offer to a teacher. 
b. Teachers only receive up to one offer at a time.  
i. If multiple schools issue an offer to one teacher, the offer from the school 
ranked highest by that teacher is presented to the teacher.  
c. The teachers then accept or reject the offer.  
i. If the teacher accepts, the match is implemented, removing both the teacher 
and the school from the market. Offers can continue to be received, but they 
will be automatically rejected. 
ii. The teacher must reject the offer to receive future offers.  
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6) Round k. 
a. Any school rejected in round k-1 issues an offer to the next teacher in their list 
that has not previously rejected the school.  
b. Teachers only receive up to one offer at a time.  
i. If multiple schools issue an offer to one teacher, the offer from the school 
ranked highest by that teacher is presented to the teacher.  
c. The teachers then accept or reject the offer.  
i. The teacher must reject the offer to receive future offers.  
 
7) End: The rounds continue until no more rejections occur.49 
3.3.6 Market Efficiency and Payoffs 
In this experiment's parameterization, under preference set 1, the maximum total 
payoff is 1350 points and can be achieved in any matches. As long as the workers invest 
their maximin amount, the surplus will just be redistributed. However, under preference 
set 2, the maximum total payoff is 1450 in a single match outcome (S1T2, S2T3, and 
S3T1), but this match outcome is not stable. As market efficiency is in terms of total 
possible payoff, if agents invest the maximin amount and enter a stable match outcome, 
efficiency would be lower in preference set 2. If the efficiency is not lower, then this is 
due to the deviation in investment in preference set 1 being substantially higher.  
Hypothesis 4: There will be a decrease in efficiency under preference set two 
because the max payoff is greater than in preference set one, but achieving the maximum 
outcome is unlikely.  
Hypothesis 5: Due to agents deviating from the maximin investment by more with 
additional participant information and under the homogenous preferences, payoffs will be 
lower in those treatments. 
                                                 
49 This matching mechanism reporting format is based from the work Chen and Sönmez (2006). 
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3.3.7 Market Stability 
In the case of a separating investment equilibria and workers following a sincere 
acceptance strategy, the SH mechanism produces a stable matching. As teachers gain 
more information about their competitors' actions, they will be better able to represent 
themselves favorably. The deceptive representation can lead to increased instability as it 
is more likely for a teacher-school pair who prefer each other cannot match due to the 
firm not being able to discern type accurately. 
Hypothesis 6: When teachers have more information about competitors' actions, 
the outcomes will be less stable.  
3.3.8 Risk 
  There are several ways the risk attitudes of agents may affect the outcomes. 
There is strategic risk in the teachers' choices in the simultaneous investment game as 
they learn the schools' preferences during the rounds or other teachers' investments. The 
optimality of their investment is dependent on the choices of competitors. Teachers may 
over invest to ensure they have a greater investment than their competitors under the 
competitive preference rankings. The probability of matching with a given school is 
affected by how their investment ranks affect school offers. Since the SH mechanism 
requires teachers to accept or reject an offer, there is the risk a teacher may remain 
unmatched in the case of rejecting an offer. Thus risk-averse teachers would be more 
likely to accept an early offer from a less preferred school. Risk-averse schools are more 
likely to issue offers to a less-preferred teacher if the perceived probability of acceptance 
from the most-preferred worker is low enough. 
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3.4 Experimental Design 
3.4.1 Treatments  
There are four treatments in this experiment. Participants took part in a market 
where the teachers were making simultaneous or sequential investments and were then 
matched to a school using the SH matching procedure. These two investment structures 
which affect participants' information were implemented as a between-subject design. 
The information treatment is crossed with competitive preferences (preference set 1) and 
less competitive preferences (preference set 2). Participants experienced both sets of 
preferences, and thus this was a within-subject implementation.  
When teachers invested simultaneously, each teacher chose their investments 
without any knowledge of the other teachers' investment decisions. However, they do 
view their competitors' investments during the market decision. This design is the most 
similar to the true market as applicants cannot control the composition of their competing 
cohort of applicants. However, they may be able to gather information during the 
interview process about where they stand and how likely they are to receive an offer. 
However, this lack of information adds an additional component of strategic risk to their 
decision. The second treatment of sequential investments was implemented to examine 
the effects of added information on investment decisions. In this treatment, teachers 
chose their investments one at a time in random order and could view the preceding 
workers' investments. To better separate the differences between the two treatments' 
investment behavior and allow the participants to understand the game better, all 
participants in the first few rounds (part one stage one) of the experiment made signaling 
investment decisions and were automatically matched to schools.  
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Seven sessions were run in total. In five of the sessions, the participants 
completed the automated firm portion, the active firms and workers portion, and the risk 
task. In the other two sessions, the participants could not complete the active firm portion 
due to technical difficulties. Three of the completed sessions had sequential investing, 
with a total of 66 participants. The other two completed sessions had simultaneous 
investing with a total of 42 participants. The decisions from the incomplete sessions were 
in the simultaneous investment environment. This resulted in 208 rounds of Simultaneous 
investment with the same preferences and automated firms and 142 in the same 
environment with heterogeneous preferences. In the rounds, where firms were also 
agents, there were 41 rounds in the homogenous, simultaneous treatment, 61 rounds in 
the homogenous, sequential treatment, 45 rounds in the heterogeneous, simultaneous 
treatment, and 89 rounds in the heterogeneous, sequential treatment. 
3.4.2 Implementation 
In the second and third stages of part one of the experiment, the teachers and 
schools were both active participants. The participants were Georgia State University 
students recruited using the ExCEN online recruiter. The participants were recruited for 
seven separate sessions, and in each session, there was only one information treatment, 
making this a between-subjects design. The experimental set up allowed for comparison 
within participants of the effects of the different parameterizations. 
In part one stage one (the first few (seven to ten) rounds), all participants were 
teachers (called workers in the experiment), and the assignment to schools (called firms 
in the experiment) was automatic based on the rank order of their investments. This 
means that in the portion where the firms were automated participants only experienced 
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preference set 1. In the remaining (13 to 20) rounds, participants were split equally into 
the roles of teachers or schools. Half of the rounds, termed part 1 stage 2, teachers and 
schools were randomly assigned a unit investment cost and their preference from either 1 
or 2. Then in part 1 stage 3, the participants remained as either a teacher or a school, 
randomly assigned a unit investment cost, and followed the other preferences. The 
ordering of preferences 1 and 2 was varied between sessions.  
In each round, participants matched with a new group to better represent the 
teacher labor market. Matching in this manner has been shown not to simulate one-shot 
game behavior resulting in systematic differences from perfect stranger matching in 
public goods games (Botelho et al., 2009). However, it does simulate a market where the 
teachers have rapid turnover and compete with similar sets of competitors through their 
careers. Besides, it is not feasible to complete this experiment with perfect stranger 
matching due to the requisite number of participants to complete the matchings.  
3.4.2.1 Decision Tasks 
1. In each round a “teacher” chooses an investment between 0 and 9. The treatment 
determines investment order, which is randomized in the sequential treatments.  (Figures 
3.1 and 3.2)
2. “Schools” know their own preferences over types but can’t observe teachers’ types. 
They issue offers to teachers after observing teachers’ investments. (Figure 3.3) 
3. Teachers know their preferences over schools. They make decisions on whether to 
accept or reject an outstanding offer knowing that acceptance ends the game. (Figures 3.4 
and 3.5) 
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4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until there are no rejections or all possible firm offers have 
been extended. This results in a maximum of three offers and six decisions per round. 
5. Once matches are finalized, the participants’ payoffs for the round are revealed, both 
the round and the stage average. The round payoff is shown to all members of the group. 
(Figures 3.6 and 3.7)
3.4.2.2 Risk Task 
After completing the first two phases of the experiment, the participants completed 
a risk elicitation section consisting of up to 50 tasks. Each task consists of a choice between 
two lotteries, Left and Right. The participants knew one task would be randomly selected 
using a dice roll, and that they would be paid based on the resolution of the lottery they had 
selected for the random task. Between the 50 tasks, the possible prizes of the lotteries and 
the probabilities of each prize were varied. The task design emulated Harrison and Ng 
(2016). Each lottery had up to three prize states, with each probability being a multiple of 
twenty-five percent. The order the tasks administered were randomized between 
participants. The first three sessions had different tasks and the number of tasks due to 
calibration, timing, and technical issues. (Figure 3.8) 
3.4.2.3 Demographic Survey and Participant Summary Statistics 
The sessions ended with a demographic survey of participants' gender, parent 
income, parental education, major, college grade point average, and race. 132 participants 
completed the demographic survey in six sessions. In the seventh session, technical 
difficulties prevented the administration of the demographic survey. The summary 
statistics of their answers are reported in Table 3.3. The majority of the participants were 
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black. There was a fairly wide range of parental income and education. The participants 
had an average GPA of 3.7.  
3.4.2.4 Payment 
The participants were paid the sum of the average payoff from all rounds in part 1 
separated by stage, and the outcome after the resolution of the lottery in the randomly-
selected risk task.  
Each round, the payoff was determined and recorded electronically following the 
investment decisions and the realized payoffs. Then to determine the outcome of the risk 
task, the proctor went to each participant and rolled a pair of dice to determine which risk 
task was chosen for implementation and then used dice or a spinner app to resolve the 
lottery. The total payment amount was written on a slip of paper for the participant to 
take to another proctor for payment. Only the experimenters, not the other participants, 
saw the payment outcomes; this ensured the experiment utilized a single-blind payment 
procedure. 
Participants were informed of this payment method before the experiment began. 
The payment mechanism's salience was assured due to maintaining an appropriate 
average payoff of $24.6, with a minimum payoff of $9 and a maximum payoff of $55. 
The experiment duration was two hours or less, including the time needed to explain the 
instructions and pay the participants, so the average payoff was higher than the minimum 
wage.  
3.5 Results 
In this experiment, I examine the effects of the information treatment and 
preference set variation on participant investment decisions, market efficiency and 
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payoffs, and market stability. For each outcome, I estimate the effects separately for each 
preference set. Each agent in the market had different incentives, so I estimate the effects 
by participant type for investment amounts and market payoffs. I split this investment 
analysis into changes to investment amount and the prevalence of participants selecting a 
type-revealing separating equilibrium. Except for individual market payoffs and the 
estimation of each worker types' likelihood to invest the most, each estimation has two 
specifications. The first includes controls to the information treatment, the firms being 
active participants, and period and session fixed effects. The second includes the 
participants' demographic and risk preference information. The additional variables 
account for the effects that participants' idiosyncratic characteristics could have on the 
decisions. For market efficiency and payoffs, I also estimate a specification including a 
binary variables for homogenous preferences and information treatment interacted with 
homogenous preferences.  
3.5.1 Signaling Decision 
Result 1: Heterogeneous preferences decrease investment amounts when 
participants are not in the information treatment. 
Support: In the rounds with simultaneous investment, all types invest more when 
the preferences are homogenous. In the information treatment, the amount is higher for 
high and low types under the heterogeneous preference set (Table 3.4). Then, when 
estimating the investment amount, the constant term (the baseline investment amount) is 
not statistically different for heterogeneous preferences than for homogenous preferences 
except for high type workers where there is an increase (Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7).  
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Result 2: The information treatment negatively impacts the investment amount 
when preferences are homogenous. 
Support: Under homogenous preferences, the information treatment negatively 
impacts the amount of worker signaling investment. The decrease in investment due to 
information, while holding other factors constant, brings the medium and low type 
workers’ investment closer to the most efficient (for the market) investment amount. 
During the rounds with the heterogeneous preference set, high types also invest closer to 
the efficient amount (Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7). Under the same preferences, all workers 
invest less in the investment treatment, and the medium type worker also invests less in 
the information treatment under heterogeneous preferences. Though the largest treatment 
effect that can be seen is that low type workers invest substantially more on average 
under different preferences (Table 3.4).   
To further investigate this phenomenon, I studied which worker types invest the 
most. When examining the averages, the high type is less likely to be the greatest investor 
in the information treatment when there are heterogeneous preferences (Table 3.4). When 
empirically estimating the probabilities of being the highest investor, the information 
treatment has a statistically significant negative effect on high types in both preference 
sets (Table 3.8). This is to be expected because in the simultaneous signaling game with 
homogeneous preferences, a high type invests 7, 8, or 9. A risk-averse type would invest 
9 to increase the likelihood of a preferred match with an additional cost of only 20 points. 
However, in the sequential signaling game, the risk-averse type would also invest 9 when 
they move first and probably second, but their investment is the max of seven and the 
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largest Observed Maximum Investment when moving last. Therefore high types are 
expected to invest less in the sequential game.   
Result 3: The signaling investments are less informative when there is additional 
information on competitors’ actions and heterogeneous preferences because the portion 
of the time investments are type revealing decreases. 
Support: For investments to reveal type (be separating), the investment amounts 
need to be negatively related to their investment costs. The high type workers invest the 
most, the middle second, and the low type the least. There is a smaller separation between 
types when there is sequential investment except for high types in preference set 2 when 
the averages are compared. When looking at the portion of the time the investments are 
completely separating, this is lower in the treatment in preference set 2 (Table 3.4). The 
remaining pooling outcome possibility that is not reported is when there are no ties, and 
the order is not type revealing. 
When agents have homogenous preferences, and the firms are also participants, 
the likelihood of investment separation increases. The information treatment decreases 
separation likelihoods under both preference sets, but the effect is greater when 
preferences are heterogeneous. In homogenous preferences, the information treatment 
also increases the likelihood of two participants selecting the same investment amount 
(Table 3.9). A scatter plot of the average investment in a period shows consistent 
investment separation (Figure 3.9). The investment is also mainly separated within 
treatments on average. When comparing the plots for the information treatment (Figures 
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3.10 and 3.12) to the non-information treatment plots (Figures 3.12 and 3.13), there is 
less separation in the information treatment.50  
3.5.2 Market Efficiency and Payoffs 
Result 4: The information treatment has no impact on market efficiency, and the 
market efficiency is higher when the preferences are homogenous.   
Support: Market efficiency estimations, as defined by the realized payoff divided 
by the maximum payoff (1350 for preference set 1 and 1450 for preference set 2), are 
reported in Table 3.10. When examining the information treatment point estimates, there 
is no statistical impact. However, when the constant terms are studied, it is revealed that 
when preferences are homogenous, the market is closer to the efficient outcome. The 
impact of the preferences may be because only investments can impact the total market 
payoff when there are homogenous preferences (the difference between matches is the 
distribution of the wealth). In contrast, under heterogeneous preferences, the match can 
affect the maximum total payoff as well.    
Result 5: The information treatment has a negative impact on the firms’ payoffs 
when preferences are heterogeneous, and these decreases for firms in total are not 
consistently at the detriment of a single firm type. 
Support: On average, firms receive a higher payoff when there are homogenous 
preferences in the information treatment and the most negative outcome when 
preferences are heterogeneous in the information treatment (Table 3.4). The information 
treatment negatively impacts total firm payoff when estimating across all rounds with 
                                                 
50 There were no consistently estimated period effects, so there appears to be little participant learning over the course 
of a session. 
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controls for preferences set and information treatment interacted with the preference set. 
However, the negative impact of the information treatment is mostly negated by the 
positive impact of the information treatment interacted with the homogenous preference 
set (Table 3.11). Further, while there are no estimated impacts of the information 
treatment in the estimates separated by preference type, each group's baseline payoff 
amount is higher when the preferences are homogenous (Tables 3.12 and 3.13). When 
examining the payoffs by individual type, none of the firm types are negatively impacted 
by the information treatment under either preference set (Table 3.14). Within worker 
types, the high-type worker is negatively impacted by information under homogenous 
preferences, which matches the fact they underinvest when preferences are homogenous. 
Medium type workers are positively impacted by information under heterogeneous 
preferences but negatively impacted when preferences are homogenous on average. This 
outcome may reverse when taking into account participant risk preferences. Low type 
workers are unaffected by the information treatment. (Table 3.4 and 3.15).  
3.5.3 Market Stability 
Result 6: The information treatment does not impact market stability, which is 
greater when preferences are homogenous. 
Support: When examining the portion of matches from the set of stable matches 
in Table 3.16, there are no statically significant estimates regarding the impact of the 
information treatment. In contrast, when examining the same preference terms, it can be 
seen that a greater portion of the matches are from the stable outcome when the 
preferences are the same; this may because the workers do not prefer the stable match in 
preference set 2 and therefore, may attempt more vigorously to alter the outcome. 




In this experiment, I was able to identify that subjects do change their investment 
behavior when they possess additional information regarding their competitors' actions 
and between preference structures. Further, market efficiency can decrease when workers 
have additional information, but this decrease depends on the market's preference 
structure. The data suggest that the differences caused by the treatments are larger for 
schools on average. The most negative effect on payoffs occurs when examining the 
impact of the information treatment within the heterogeneous preferences. The greatest 
positive difference being homogenous preferences over heterogeneous preferences within 
the information treatment. The workers' average payoffs decrease the most when moving 
from preference set 2 to preference set 1 within the information treatment. Still, their 
payoffs are always higher in preference set 2 than preference set 1 and in the information 
treatment on average. 
Overall the interaction of the Spence signaling game and two-sided matching 
markets leads to interesting participant behavior. In this labor market, it appears best to 
not let the teachers observe their competitors' investments if the goal is to promote the 
schools' welfare, mainly when the preferences of schools and teachers are varied.  




Table 3.1 Cost of Signal by Type and Fixed Investment Payoff 
Investment 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Fixed Payment 0 40 40 40 120 120 120 170 170 170 
High Type Worker 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Medium Type Worker 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 
Low Type Worker 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 
 
Table 3.2 Preference Parameterization 
 Preference Set 1 Preference Set 2 
 Top Second Bottom Top Second Bottom 
Teacher High 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Teacher Medium 1 2 3 1 3 2 
Teacher Low 1 2 3 3 2 1 
School 1 1 2 3 3 2 1 
School 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 
School 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Payoff 300 200 100 300 200 100 
 
Table 3.3 Participant Summary Statistics 
 All Information 
Treatment 
Not Treated All 







Education Level 1.809 0.596 1.862 0.583 1.758 0.609 1 3 
GPA 3.748 0.516 3.769 0.493 3.727 0.542 2 4 
Gender 0.344 0.477 0.292 0.458 0.394 0.492 0 1 
High Father’s 
Education 
0.206 0.406 0.277 0.451 0.136 0.346 0 1 
High Mother’s 
Education 
0.252 0.436 0.323 0.471 0.182 0.389 0 1 
High Father’s 
Income 
0.573 0.497 0.615 0.490 0.530 0.502 0 1 
High Mother’s 
Income 
0.481 0.501 0.523 0.503 0.439 0.500 0 1 
White 0.137 0.346 0.231 0.424 0.045 0.210 0 1 
Hispanic 0.092 0.290 0.108 0.312 0.076 0.267 0 1 
Black 0.695 0.462 0.661 0.477 0.727 0.448 0 1 
Non-White Other 0.174 0.381 0.092 0.292 0.258 0.441 0 1 
Percent Risk Choice 
with Riskier Option 
0.392 0.167 0.365 0.150 0.419 0.179 .04 .86 
Notes: 131 participants reported their demographic information.  
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Table 3.4 Investment and Market Outcomes When Firms are Participants 
Preferences over other 
side of the market 
Same  Different  
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Separation and Pooling Decisions 
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Table 3.5 Investment of High Type Teachers 
 Same Different 
     
VARIABLES No Descriptors Descriptors  No Descriptors Descriptors  
     
Information 
Treatment 
-2.136*** -2.193*** -0.328 -2.873*** 
 (0.539) (0.518) (0.556) (0.676) 
Active Firms -0.672 -0.607   
 (0.541) (0.764)   
Percent of Risky 
Choices Selected 
 0.859  3.146*** 
 (0.713)  (0.970) 
Observed Maximum 
Investment 
 0.006  0.010 
 (0.046)  (0.038) 
Education Level 2  0.632**  0.856** 
  (0.293)  (0.352) 
Education Level 3  0.725  -0.124 
  (0.507)  (0.246) 
GPA Reported  0.149  -0.983** 
  (0.245)  (0.435) 
Gender  0.399  -0.410 
  (0.290)  (0.640) 
Father had Higher 
Education 
 -0.602*  2.332*** 
 (0.354)  (0.640) 
Mother had Higher 
Education 
 0.311  1.256*** 
 (0.312)  (0.323) 
Black  -0.518*  -0.766** 
  (0.287)  (0.276) 
Constant 5.689*** 4.866*** 6.520*** 9.961*** 
 (0.401) (0.997) (0.866) (1.505) 
Period Fixed Effects X X X X 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X 
Observations 452 394 134 134 
R-squared 0.264 0.328 0.065 0.316 
Notes: The dependent variable is the investment amount of the worker in a single round. Active firms is a 
binary indicator for if the rounds were after stage 1 of part 1. Percent of Risky Choices Selected is the 
number of choices in the risk task the participant selected the one with greater variance in outcomes divided 
by total number of completed choices. Observed Maximum Investment of others is zero for the 
simultaneous game and first investors, and the maximum of the earlier investors for the second and third 
investors in the sequential game. Education level 2 is some college and Education level 3 is college degree 
or greater. Gender is a binary variable equal to 1 if the participant was female. Mother and Father had a 
Higher Education means the parent in question had a master’s degree, a doctorate, or a professional degree. 
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Table 3.6 Investment of Medium Type Teachers 
 Same Different 
     
VARIABLES No Descriptors Descriptors  No Descriptors Descriptors  
     
Information 
Treatment 
-0.777 -1.085* -2.100 -1.655 
(0.523) (0.621) (1.532) (1.828) 
Active Firms -0.046 -0.458   
 (0.691) (0.954)   
Percent of Risky 
Choices Selected 
 1.327  0.525 
 (0.927)  (1.796) 
Observed Maximum 
Investment 
 0.022  0.087 
 (0.048)  (0.088) 
Education Level 2  0.358  0.467 
  (0.329)  (0.528) 
Education Level 3  0.661  0.347 
  (0.526)  (1.632) 
GPA Reported  -0.243  -1.180* 
  (0.279)  (0.620) 
Gender  -0.164  -0.060 
  (0.397)  (1.110) 
Father had Higher 
Education 
 -0.736*  -0.832 
 (0.374)  (0.847) 
Mother had Higher 
Education 
 0.395  -0.107 
 (0.336)  (1.054) 
Black  -0.442  -0.719 
  (0.354)  (0.836) 
Constant 5.048*** 5.601*** 4.438** 8.255** 
 (0.454) (1.236) (1.820) (3.845) 
Period Fixed Effects X X X X 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X 
Observations 452 396 134 134 
R-squared 0.128 0.166 0.356 0.486 
Notes: Dependent variable is the investment amount of the worker in a single round. All explanatory 
variables are as defined in the note of Table 7. 
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Table 3.7 Investment of Low Type Teachers 
 Same Different 
     
VARIABLES No Descriptors Descriptors  No Descriptors Descriptors  
     
Information 
Treatment 
-0.332 -1.019* 0.945 -0.033 
(0.553) (0.575) (1.830) (2.369) 
Active Firms -0.003 0.960   
 (0.836) (0.929)   
Percent of Risky 
Choices Selected 
 -0.132  -0.700 
 (0.939)  (6.568) 
Observed Maximum 
Investment 
 0.109**  0.084 
  (0.054)  (0.084) 
Education Level 2  0.325  1.372* 
  (0.347)  (0.717) 
Education Level 3  -0.036  -1.520 
  (0.652)  (2.804) 
GPA Reported  0.523*  -0.549 
  (0.268)  (1.760) 
Gender  0.297  0.610 
  (0.351)  (1.531) 
Father had Higher 
Education 
 -0.671*  -2.464 
 (0.383)  (1.604) 
Mother had Higher 
Education 
 -0.616  1.368 
 (0.398)  (1.738) 
Black  -0.211  -0.916 
  (0.457)  (1.413) 
Constant 3.870*** 2.367* 6.197** 8.449 
 (0.367) (1.285) (2.428) (6.134) 
Period Fixed Effects X X X X 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X 
Observations 452 397 134 134 
R-squared 0.102 0.151 0.206 0.408 
Notes: Dependent variable is the investment amount of the worker in a single round. All explanatory 
variables are as defined in the note of Table 7. 
  
       
122 
 
Table 3.8 Teachers Invest the Most 
 Same Different 
VARIABLES High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Information Treatment -0.072 0.119** 0.124 -0.222** 0.322** 0.051 
 (0.067) (0.053) (0.098) (0.088) (0.151) (0.191) 
Active Firms 0.116* 0.007 -0.052    
 (0.066) (0.056) (0.047)    
Percent of Risky Choices Selected -0.028 0.337** 0.115 -0.066 -0.830* -0.118 
 (0.196) (0.143) (0.102) (0.216) (0.465) (0.501) 
Observed Maximum Investment -0.014 -0.021** 0.000 -0.016 0.009 0.016* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.009) 
Education Level 2 0.056 0.047 -0.001 0.105 0.077 0.072** 
 (0.065) (0.048) (0.038) (0.080) (0.104) (0.036) 
Education Level 3 0.040 0.138 -0.022 0.095 0.006 0.295 
 (0.097) (0.090) (0.064) (0.112) (0.081) (0.238) 
GPA Reported -0.030 -0.044 0.017 -0.134** 0.037  
 (0.053) (0.033) (0.027) (0.064) (0.028)  
Gender 0.128* -0.061 0.031 0.227** 0.410**  
 (0.067) (0.056) (0.041) (0.091) (0.171)  
Father had Higher Education -0.187** -0.167*** -0.088* -0.020 0.099  
 (0.078) (0.065) (0.051) (0.123) (0.106)  
Mother had Higher Education 0.016 0.059 -0.125** 0.329*** -0.247 0.354** 
 (0.079) (0.044) (0.058) (0.043) (0.152) (0.170) 
Black -0.068 -0.033 0.024 -0.469*** -0.291* -0.305*** 
 (0.065) (0.053) (0.042) (0.099) (0.170) (0.085) 
Observations 394 396 397 134 134 85 
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator if the worker type of the column invested the most in their group without tying their competitors in a single round. All 
explanatory variables are as defined in the note of Table 7. 
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Table 3.9 Investment Separation-Same vs Different Preferences 
 Same Different 








       
Information Treatment -0.094** 0.115** 0.020 -0.177*** 0.039 0.000 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.017) (0.061) (0.091) (0.027) 
Active Firms 0.143*** -0.070 -0.042    
 (0.044) (0.056) (0.029)    
Observations 452 452 452 134 134 134 
Notes: Separating is if Worker 10 invested more than worker 20 who invested more than worker 30. Partial Pooling is if two participants invested the same 
amount. Full Pooling is if all three participants invested the same amount. 
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Table 3.10 Market Efficiency 










 No Descriptors Descriptors No Descriptors Descriptors No Descriptors Descriptors 
Information Treatment -0.072* -0.053 0.016 -0.009 -0.068 -0.024 
(0.038) (0.058) (0.099) (0.116) (0.047) (0.073) 
Same Preferences 0.082* 0.075*     
 (0.042) (0.044)     
Information x Same 
Preferences 
0.010 0.019     
(0.053) (0.055)     
Average Percent Risky 
Choices Selected 
 -0.103  -0.007  -0.075 
 (0.186)  (0.303)  (0.248) 
Average GPA  0.108  -0.011  0.219** 
  (0.071)  (0.123)  (0.088) 
Percent Female  0.053  0.046  0.022 
  (0.081)  (0.117)  (0.116) 
Percent Black  0.057  0.015  0.085 
  (0.078)  (0.119)  (0.105) 
Percent with High 
Mother’s Income 
 0.070  -0.066  0.309*** 
 (0.068)  (0.096)  (0.102) 
Percent with High 
Mother’s Education 
 -0.045  -0.017  -0.128 
 (0.086)  (0.134)  (0.115) 
Session Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Period Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Constant 0.797*** 0.350 0.908*** 0.952* 0.815*** -0.115 
 (0.088) (0.321) (0.055) (0.522) (0.109) (0.406) 
Observations 236 225 102 97 134 128 
R-squared 0.158 0.182 0.147 0.142 0.165 0.290 
Notes: Dependent variable is the sum of the payoffs to a group divided by the maximum possible payoff (1350 under homogenous preferences and 1450 under 
heterogeneous preferences) in a single round. All explanatory variables are as defined in the note of Table 7. 
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Table 3.11 Market Payoffs-All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Workers Firms Total Workers Firms Total 
VARIABLES No Descriptors No Descriptors No Descriptors Descriptors Descriptors Descriptors 
Information Treatment 9.110 -113.899*** -103.768* 18.540 -141.789*** -75.309 
 (23.436) (29.770) (53.941) (29.980) (44.997) (82.204) 
Active Firms -21.786   -23.412   
 (28.662)   (35.901)   
Same Preferences 9.563 -13.031 29.429 -5.469 -13.640 19.193 
 (23.357) (32.482) (58.855) (25.672) (33.750) (61.657) 
Information x Same 
Preferences 
-40.324 108.819*** 15.161 -24.727 110.682*** 27.331 
(24.915) (41.550) (75.286) (27.272) (42.413) (77.483) 
Average Percent Risky 
Choices Selected 
   -57.054 58.631 -148.083 
   (68.224) (143.497) (262.151) 
Average GPA    12.851 54.994 157.704 
    (21.832) (54.454) (99.480) 
Percent Female    11.985 80.764 75.141 
    (25.218) (62.490) (114.161) 
Percent Black    -10.849 90.199 81.992 
    (25.735) (60.540) (110.599) 
Percent with High Mother’s 
Education 
   35.371 14.391 105.378 
   (25.743) (52.832) (96.517) 
Percent with High Father’s 
Education 
   5.374 -84.724 -64.731 
   (28.954) (66.701) (121.854) 
Session Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Period Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Constant 679.512*** 493.778*** 1,155.906*** 649.993*** 194.383 506.251 
 (28.223) (68.578) (124.259) (99.388) (247.575) (452.288) 
Observations 586 236 236 514 225 225 
R-squared 0.089 0.188 0.105 0.092 0.223 0.132 
Notes: Dependent variable is the sum of the payoffs of all workers, firms, or participants in a group in a single round. All explanatory variables are as defined in 
the note of Table 7. 
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Table 3.12 Market Payoffs-Same 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Descriptors Descriptors Descriptors 
Information Treatment -3.324 9.524 22.143 -1.075 -25.635 -11.834 
 (13.712) (61.507) (134.008) (18.965) (65.418) (155.975) 
Active Firms -9.546   -21.042   
 (21.797)   (28.904)   
Average Percent Risky 
Choices Selected 
   0.887 -39.175 -9.974 
   (48.980) (171.544) (409.011) 
Average GPA    -5.864 -35.377 -14.969 
    (15.351) (69.709) (166.208) 
Percent Female    12.197 87.724 61.665 
    (17.498) (66.492) (158.537) 
Percent Black    -11.448 40.029 20.637 
    (18.069) (67.250) (160.343) 
Percent with High Mother’s 
Education 
   6.086 -70.188 -89.760 
   (18.165) (54.317) (129.508) 
Percent with High Father’s 
Education 
   4.641 -21.685 -22.400 
   (20.393) (75.793) (180.713) 
Session Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Period Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Constant 668.365*** 553.810*** 1,226.324*** 691.275*** 683.412** 1,285.462* 
 (13.279) (34.320) (74.775) (67.673) (295.726) (705.099) 
Observations 452 102 102 386 97 97 
R-squared 0.115 0.330 0.147 0.107 0.388 0.142 
Notes: Dependent variable is the sum of the payoffs of all workers, firms, or participants in a group in a single round. All explanatory variables are as defined in 
the note of Table 7. 
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Table 3.13 Market Payoffs-Different 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Descriptors Descriptors Descriptors 
Information Treatment -32.657 -65.718 -98.375 67.183 -102.359 -35.177 
 (52.679) (39.782) (67.917) (85.979) (64.654) (106.261) 
Average Percent Risky 
Choices Selected 
   -239.415 130.979 -108.436 
   (291.493) (219.196) (360.255) 
Average GPA    187.820* 129.603* 317.423** 
    (103.496) (77.827) (127.911) 
Percent Female    -16.028 47.264 31.236 
    (136.578) (102.703) (168.796) 
Percent Black    -4.023 127.585 123.563 
    (122.773) (92.323) (151.734) 
Percent with High Mother’s 
Education 
   286.069** 162.090* 448.159*** 
   (119.615) (89.948) (147.832) 
Percent with High Father’s 
Education 
   -19.692 -166.161 -185.853 
   (135.435) (101.844) (167.383) 
Session Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Period Fixed Effect X X X X X X 
Constant 779.354*** 402.076*** 1,181.430*** 65.640 -231.957 -166.316 
 (122.932) (92.836) (158.491) (475.805) (357.795) (588.046) 
Observations 134 134 134 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.196 0.168 0.165 0.268 0.245 0.290 
Notes: Dependent variable is the sum of the payoffs of all workers, firms, or participants in a group in a single round. All explanatory variables are as defined in 
the note of Table 7. 
  





Table 3.134 Payoff of Schools 
 Same Preferences Different Preferences 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 1 2 3 
       
Information 
Treatment 
23.740 71.263 -6.087 -24.761 31.317 -5.529 
(98.945) (60.319) (72.444) (15.348) (41.678) (18.053) 
Percent of Risky 
Choices Selected 
30.770 -179.172** 210.473*** 12.069 -40.876 -29.006 
(47.091) (83.965) (63.071) (30.581) (91.792) (41.968) 
Education Level 2 -23.162 33.549  -5.146 6.192  
 (37.740) (34.929)  (8.817) (18.947)  
Education Level 3 -30.599 -52.317 -57.808*** 59.585*** -39.677 17.727 
 (44.663) (38.785) (16.844) (14.305) (32.767) (10.487) 
GPA Reported 120.889*** -3.473 -3.117 -38.120*** -12.825 -94.695*** 
 (25.497) (25.009) (31.711) (9.366) (20.409) (13.707) 
Gender 28.624 41.632* 18.073 49.564*** -32.957* 28.636 
 (34.632) (21.929) (30.873) (11.842) (16.796) (17.171) 
Father had Higher 
Education 
53.075 - -78.706** 49.629***  4.177 
 (44.650)  (30.533) (8.792)  (14.471) 
Mother had Higher 
Education 
-56.776*** 0.672 32.979 -38.104*** -0.846 -25.141* 
 (9.064) (26.565) (22.254) (12.237) (17.316) (11.944) 
Black 26.659 -38.272 -33.098 -50.729*** -3.276 -16.304* 
 (18.583) (24.167) (53.459) (13.126) (18.285) (8.813) 
Period Fixed Effects X X X X X X 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X X X 
Observations 97 102 102 134 128 134 
Notes: Dependent variable is the payoff of an individual firm in a single round. All explanatory variables 
are as defined in the note of Table 7. 
  





Table 3.145 Payoff of Teachers 
 Same Preferences Different Preferences 
VARIABLES High Same Middle Low High Middle Low 
       
Information 
Treatment 
-81.506*** 43.578** 28.229 0.049 -66.183* 45.173 
 (22.532) (21.954) (17.847) (70.584) (33.522) (36.276) 
Active Firms -29.747 -2.193 -2.515    
 (28.151) (38.740) (38.800)    
Percent of Risky 
Choices Selected 
59.690* 6.271 1.466 -66.300 -100.711** -196.799* 




-2.548 -1.853 -0.241 -11.277 6.467 -5.204** 
 (2.694) (2.234) (1.965) (6.878) (4.800) (2.377) 
Education Level 2 32.733** 33.639*** 0.821 -34.916 -19.060** 7.022 
 (12.650) (11.568) (9.349) (40.002) (8.925) (20.057) 
Education Level 3 25.585 38.043** 10.714 -44.259** -117.788*** -11.127 
 (17.016) (16.287) (19.009) (18.795) (37.268) (53.524) 
GPA Reported 13.038 -9.291 -0.922 -0.213 17.401 -21.897 
 (11.559) (9.665) (8.407) (37.321) (13.021) (24.290) 
Gender 3.268 3.932 -6.150 13.207 -2.672 -8.068 
 (11.783) (12.047) (9.413) (44.059) (23.796) (30.659) 
Father had Higher 
Education 
-36.921*** -5.997 -4.936 104.674 6.218 16.658 
 (11.951) (13.795) (9.982) (65.089) (12.831) (18.450) 
Mother had 
Higher Education 
-10.571 17.322 -9.810 43.808 -20.501 -
71.955**
* 
 (11.559) (11.984) (11.680) (27.790) (14.521) (17.046) 
Black -16.042 -17.205 10.528 112.372**
* 
3.730 13.610 
 (11.863) (12.470) (9.757) (37.524) (17.664) (33.276) 
Period Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X X X 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
X X X X X X 
Observations 394 396 397 134 134 134 
Notes: Dependent variable is the payoff of an individual worker in a single round. All explanatory variables 
are as defined in the note of Table 7. 





Table 3.16 Market Stability 
     
 School Stable  School Stable  
VARIABLES No 
Descriptors 
 Descriptors  
Information Treatment -0.113  -0.048  
 (0.073)  (0.089)  
Active Firms -0.097  -0.102  
 (0.090)  (0.107)  
Same Preferences 0.209***  0.242***  
 (0.073)  (0.077)  
Information x Same 
Preferences 
-0.013  -0.043  
(0.078)  (0.081)  
Average Percent Risky 
Choices Selected 
  -0.196  
  (0.203)  
Average GPA   -0.050  
   (0.065)  
Percent Female   0.113  
   (0.075)  
Percent Black   -0.048  
   (0.077)  
Percent with High Mother’s 
Income 
  -0.016  
  (0.077)  
Percent with High Mother’s 
Education 
  0.010  
  (0.086)  
Session Fixed Effect X  X  
Period Fixed Effect X  X  
Constant 0.194**  0.417  
 (0.088)  (0.296)  
Observations 586  514  
R-squared 0.190  0.196  
Notes: Dependent variable is the percent of matches in a group in a single round that are part of the stable 
market outcome. All explanatory variables are as defined in the note of Table 7.  






Figure 3.1 Simultaneous Investment Screen 
 
Figure 3.2 Sequential Investment Screen 
 





Figure 3.3 Firm Investment Screen 
 
Figure 3.4 Worker Decision Screen - Offer 
 





Figure 3.5 Worker Decision Screen - No Offer 
 
Figure 3.6 Market Match Outcomes 
 
  





Figure 3.7 Match Outcome Payoff Screen 
 
Figure 3.8 Risk Task Example 
 
 





Figure 3.9 Investment Scatter Plot-All Workers 
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Figure 3.11 Investment Scatter Plot –Information Treatment and Different Preferences 
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3.9 Appendix A. Strategic Behavior 
Strategic behavior is likely to occur in the worker investment decisions as the 
benefits of matching with their preferred school (100 for every rank higher) outweigh the 
investment benefits of selecting the maximin investment amount51. If the worker achieves 
a better match of one rank by investing more the worker’s payoff always increases. The 
considerable boost from better matches gives the teachers incentives to invest 
strategically to attract a more preferred firm and attempt to receive a higher overall 
payoff. This strategic action requires workers to know what type their firm prefers, which 
is likely to occur with the rapid turnover and thus repeated participation of teachers in the 
teacher labor market. An example of the strategic investment in the true teacher labor 
market could be the amount of education they complete or the credentials they achieve to 
improve their chances of a better placement. In the market, teachers can also strategically 
accept or reject offers.  
By a similar token as workers rejecting a firm if they believe they can receive a 
better offer, schools can strategically order their offers. If multiple firms make offers to 
the same worker simultaneously, the system presents only the worker's most preferred 
option. The mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools in any information environment 
as schools can obtain a better match by issuing an offer to a teacher who is not their most 
preferred teacher but who would be more likely to accept an early offer, particularly in 
preference set 1.  Making an offer to their most preferred teacher might result in losing 
                                                 
51 The max additional payoff from the investment is 100 for high types (170 (investment payoff)-70 (investment cost)), 
then 40 for medium (120 (investment payoff)-80 (investment cost)), and 10 for low types (40 (investment payoff)-30 
(investment cost)).  





their second-best candidate while waiting for the best candidate to reject their offer. 
Suppose a firm expects to be automatically rejected by their most preferred worker. In 
that case, the firm may choose instead to offer the job to their second preferred worker 
first if they have a better chance of being accepted by that worker. In the case of a 
separating investment equilibrium and a sincere workers’ acceptance strategy (workers 
accepting their first offer), in preferences set one, a strategic offer by school three would 
be to make the first offer to the worker with the second highest level of investment rather 
than the top investor as illustrated below in Example 2. However, in the same set of 
assumption under preferences set 2, there are no such incentives for strategic offers. 
The examples assume a separating investment equilibrium (worker types are 
perfectly revealed) and workers following a sincere acceptance strategy (workers will 
accept their first offer)52. In this case, Firm 3 can obtain a better match by issuing an offer 
to the medium type worker first. Under heterogeneous preferences, if workers accept 
their first offer, then the round will end due to the firms' disjoint first preference.  
Example 1-Homogenous Preferences Non-Strategic Behavior 
1 Round 2 Round 3  
1 High 1 High 1 High 
2 Medium 2 Medium 2 Medium 
3 Low 3 Low 3 Low 
*Blue Arrow -the school is kept. Red arrow -the school is rejected.  
  
                                                 
52 This second assumption is for ease of the example, this is likely to be the case, if a participant is risk averse and fears 
not matching.  





Example 2-Homogenous Preferences Strategic Behavior 
1 Round 2 Round 3  
1 High 1 High 1 High 
2 Medium 2 Medium 2 Medium 
3 Low 3 Low 3 Low 
*Blue Arrow -the school is kept. Red arrow -the school is rejected.  
 
Example 3-Heterogeneous Preferences  
1   
1 High     
2 Medium     
3 Low     
*Blue Arrow -the school is kept. Red arrow -the school is rejected, Black is no match  
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